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I. Introduction 
 
The onslaught of the global economic crisis has thrown many workers in different parts of the 
world out of their jobs and many in the developing economies have fallen into situations of 
poverty.  In search for the proper response to the crisis, various governments have turned to 
stimulus spending as a strategy to preserve and create jobs for their affected citizenry.   
 
The ILO tripartite constituents – government, workers and employers – designed a Global Jobs 
Pact (GJP) during the International Labour Conference in 2009. The GJP serves as a guiding 
framework to national and international policies aimed at stimulating economic recovery, 
generating jobs and providing protection to working people and their families. It seeks to 
promote a job-intensive recovery from the crisis.  
 
The Pact is built around the principles of the ILO’s Decent Work agenda. It looks at the issues of 
employment generation and sustainable enterprises. It emphasizes the need for a basic social 
protection floor. It calls attention to the importance of protecting and promoting rights at work in 
a crisis situation. It encourages the practice of social dialogue and collective bargaining as 
critical tools to identify priorities and assist in policy design and implementation. It calls for 
implementing measures quickly in a coordinated manner, and for integrating gender concerns 
throughout. The GJP is the response of the ILO and its tripartite constituency to the global crisis.  
 
The Pact contains a package of crisis-response and recovery measures.  It is not a one-size-fits-
all solution, but a portfolio of policy options that countries can adapt to their specific needs and 
situation. Indeed, a coherent and credible agenda for a rich-job recovery can only result from an 
in-depth national policy debate and consultation among policy makers and key stakeholders.  
 
Since 2001, the Philippines has adopted the Decent Work Common Agenda outlining projects 
and activities that will help workers, employers and government, achieve the major objectives of 
Decent Work. The current global crisis could be seen as an opportunity to craft stronger short 
term and long term responses that can incorporate key elements from the framework of the 
Global Jobs Pact and help the country restore viable economic growth, employment generation 
and poverty eradication. 
  
II. Background and Objectives of the Study  
 
This study is part of an ILO-Norway project on Policy Coherence for Growth, Employment and 
Decent Work – Promoting Decent Work responses to the global economic crisis, managed by the 
Policy Integration Department of ILO Headquarters.  The project is supporting the design of 
decent work intensive, gender-responsive programmes in a few selected developing countries 
affected by the global crisis. In particular, the study hopes to provide (i.) a rapid robust 
assessment of the social and labour market impact of the crisis, (ii.) a review of the policy 
measures taken by government to address critical Decent Work deficits resulting from the crisis 
or those already existing even before the crisis (iii.) proposals for the engagement of the ILO 
constituents, national agencies and development partners in developing suitable policy responses 
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and/or reorienting existing Decent Work Country Programmes and other development 
frameworks. The project will also emphasize issues of policy coherence between economic and 
social ministerial portfolios and the agencies of the multilateral system, building on work on 
policy coherence done under a previous phase.  
 
In the context of the Philippines, the study will give an overview of the macroeconomy and how 
the global crisis affected it including the labour market. How the government responded and 
also, the preliminary outcomes and impact of its intervention will also be examined.  During the 
last quarter of 2008, the Philippine Government prepared an Economic Resiliency Plan (ERP) 
that aimed to create new jobs and focus on quick spending of the 2009 national budget as a 
stimulus package that will hopefully also address the needs in health, infrastructure, agriculture, 
education, livelihoods and social protection.  Early ILO commissioned studies i.e. “A Rapid 
Assessment on the Impact of the Crisis” and “A Preliminary Snapshot on the Impact of Crisis” 
highlighted the institutional challenges in delivering a coherent policy and programme response 
to both the economic and social impact of the crisis.  The paper will also examine the 
government response in terms of policy and program measures which address critical Decent 
Work deficits as a result of the crisis and also those already existing even before the crisis.  
Finally, it will also discuss issues of timeliness, policy coherence, and institutional coordination 
in terms of the government’s response. 
 
III. A Framework for Analysis: Transmission Channels and the Response 
 
The chart below shows a simple framework in assessing the government response to the global 
financial crisis.  It specifically illustrates how the current crisis will affect the Philippine 
economy through various transmission channels, the impacts of the crisis and how the 
government responds through monetary, fiscal and social policies.   The criteria for assessing the 
government response are also shown in the chart. 
 
A.  The Transmission Channels of the Crisis    
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) will affect the country through: 
- Asset Markets:  Real estate, bond and stock prices plunge as risks increase and investor 
appetites decrease 
- Banking System: Problems arise in local banks exposed to the toxic products sold in the 
financial markets in the US; this is very limited though in the case of the Philippines; 
credit becomes tight as banks become selective in lending 
- Prices and Exchange Rates: Instability in the financial sector may also create instability 
in the exchange rates and prices 
- Trade: Exports and imports decrease because of weak demand from developed 
economies resulting to closure of companies or temporary shutdowns 
- Overseas employment: Value of remittances sent has also declined as OFWs get laid off 
from their jobs 
- Foreign Direct Investments: Inflows slow down as the crisis heightens and as investors 
avoid risks 
 
B. Government Response 
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The government’s strategy for mitigating the impact of the crisis includes: 
 
- Monetary Policy: Ensuring that the banking system is sound and credit continues to flow 
in the economy; loosening monetary policy by decreasing interest rates and using other 
tools available to the Central Bank and maintaining stability of prices and exchange rates 
 
- Fiscal Policy: Stimulating the economy through increased government spending in key 
areas of the economy e.g. infrastructure and other services; these will generate jobs for 
unemployed and displaced workers and ensure vulnerable sectors survive the crisis  
 
- Social Policy: Implementing social protection measures which include various safety 
nets, insurance and employment schemes for the formal and informal sectors and most 
especially for the vulnerable and poor sectors. 
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Chart 1 A Framework for Assessing the Government's Response to the Crisis 
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C. Assessing the Response 
 
- Planning and Design Stage:  
Consultative Processes: How government solicited inputs from various takeholders 
Timeliness: How quick the government is able to respond to the crisis; How fast the 
programmes are put in place which specifically target the affected sectors 
Tageting: How the government is able to determine the affected sectors 
 
- Implementation Stage 
Resources Mobilized: Whether the resources mobilized by government was adequate and 
sufficient and whether it was able to mobilize resources from other stakeholders 
Institutional Coordination: Whether government was able to successfully coordinate the 
various agencies (national and local) and stakeholders in responding to the response and 
whether the coordination mechanism actually worked during the crisis 
Policy Coherence: Whether the major programs and policies for the response are 
coherent and do not negate/contradict each other 
Reach and Coverage of Programmes 
Relevance and Impact of the Programs for the Affected Sectors and the Economy as a 
Whole: How the programs actually mitigate the negative impact of the crisis – impact on 
economic growth, employment, poverty incidence, etc. 
 
- Monitoring Stage 
Mechanisms for Getting Feedback from Households: Whether government has set up 
mechanisms for immediate feedback among ordinary households aside from mechanisms 
that consult organized sectors and stakeholders 
M&E mechanism: How the government assesses its programmes and adopt necessary 
changes for underperforming ones 
 
IV. The Macroeconomic and Labour Impact of the Crisis 
 
A.  The Philippine Macroeconomy Prior to the Crisis: Some Structural Issues 
 
The Philippine macroeconomy has been confronted with several structural problems in recent 
years.  It will be important to discuss this before examining the impact of the crisis as some 
of the effects of the GFC simply exacerbate what the economy is currently going through. In 
addition, some vulnerabilities of the economy have been highlighted because of the crisis. 
 
1. Boom and Bust Cycles  
 
In its recent economic history, the Philippines has suffered from boom and bust cycles where 
the latter has always been associated with economic or political crises, natural or man-made 
disasters and internal and external triggers.  In the graph below, the troughs are always 
related to a certain type of crisis.  The Latin American debt crisis aggravated by the Aquino 
assassination leading to the EDSA uprising were the key factors that caused of the downturn 
from 1983-85.  The natural disasters, the various coup attempts and the energy crisis were 
major reasons for the economic slump from 1990-1992.  The East Asian financial crisis 
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meanwhile effected another big decline in output from 1998-1999.  Yet another political 
crisis, the ouster of Estrada in 2000-2001 again affected the macroeconomy severely. 
 
Chart 2 GDP Growth Rates, 1981-2008 
 
  Source: ADB Outlook Indicators 2009 
 
To make a long story short, the Philippine economy has always been vulnerable to these 
various crises starting especially in the 1980s.  The economy was on the upturn during the 
1960s and 1970s with a 5%–6% growth rate, its economy slumped in the 1980s and mid-
1990s when average real GDP growth was around 2%. Only recently has the Philippines 
returned to its moderate expansion trend of around 5%. However, its average rate during 
2001–2007 is still among the lowest in ASEAN. 
 
Table 1: Average Gross Domestic Product Growth Rates, 1960 - 2007 
Country 
Average 
1961–
1970 
Average 
1971–
1980 
Average 
1981–
1990 
Average 
1991–
1995 
Average 
1996–
2000 
Average 
2001–
2007 
Cambodia … …  7.77 7.34 9.68 
Indonesia 4.18 7.87 6.41 7.87 0.98 5.07 
Lao PDR NA NA 4.54 6.42 6.17 6.56 
Malaysia 6.49 7.87 6.03 9.47 4.99 4.79 
Philippines 4.93 5.92 1.80 2.19 3.96 5.02 
Singapore 9.88 8.83 7.49 8.87 6.40 5.34 
Thailand 8.17 6.89 7.89 8.62 0.64 5.05 
Viet Nam NA NA 4.63 8.21 6.96 7.74 
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators; author’s computations 
 
 2. A Consumption Driven Economy 
 
The Philippine economy has been driven by private consumption expenditures (PCE) in the last 
several years.  From 2000 till the present, PCE has averaged almost 70% of GDP.  This is a 
relatively large proportion compared to that of the other ASEAN countries except Cambodia (see 
Table 2).   PCE meanwhile are catalyzed by remittances from overseas workers.   From 2006 to 
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2008,  deployment of overseas workers have breached the 1.2 million mark (see Chart 3).  A 
recent estimate by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) on the stock of overseas 
Filipinos shows that around 8.7 million are working abroad.  About 47.36% or 4.13 million are 
temporary workers while permanent residents account for 42.31% or 3.69 million.  Irregular2 
workers meanwhile comprise 10.32% of the total or .9 million. These workers are scattered 
across all continents (see Chart 3). Remittances have also been rising rapidly from 1975 (see 
Chart 4) and has reached more than US$ 14 billion in 2007.  Sectors that are driven by 
remittances include wholesale and retail trade, telecommunications, housing, construction, and 
real estate. 
 
Chart 3: OFW Deployment by Destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Philippine Migration and Development Statistical Almanac (2009) 
 
Chart 4: Remittances in US$ (1975-2007) 
 
Source: Philippine Migration and Development Statistical Almanac (2009)
                                                 
2
 These are workers without valid visas or those who entered host countries illegally 
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Table 2: Private Consumption Expenditures as Percentage of GDP, 1995-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Southeast Asia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Brunei Darussalam a 36.6 38.7 39.3 40.3 34.5 24.8 26.3 25.6 27.3 26.6 22.5 19.8 20.1 
Cambodia 92.6 95.2 88.2 92.9 87.5 86.7 83.1 83.9 83.6 85.1 84.3 81.0 78.2 
Indonesia 61.6 62.4 61.7 67.8 73.9 61.7 61.7 67.6 68.1 66.8 64.4 62.7 63.6 
Lao PDR … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Malaysia 47.9 46.0 45.3 41.6 41.6 43.8 46.1 45.0 44.6 44.0 44.8 45.0 45.8 
Myanmar … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Philippines   74.1 73.5 72.6 74.3 72.6 69.6 70.6 69.4 69.2 68.7 69.3 70.1 69.4 
Singapore 42.3 41.6 41.0 40.0 42.2 42.2 46.0 46.6 46.1 42.4 40.6 39.5 38.6 
Thailand 53.2 53.8 54.7 54.2 56.0 56.1 57.3 57.2 57.2 57.2 57.2 55.8 53.7 
Viet Nam  73.6 74.4 71.8 70.9 68.6 66.5 64.9 65.1 66.3 65.1 63.5 63.3 64.8 
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3.  An Economy with Declining Investments 
 
Another important characteristic of the Philippine economy is the continuing decline in 
investments despite recent moderate growth.  Chart 5 shows the decline of Gross Capital 
Formation as percent of GDP from a high of 24.8 in 1997 to a low of 14.5 in 2006.  Again this is 
relatively low as compared to the other ASEAN countries except for Brunei.  Reasons for such 
downtrend include high costs of doing business, poor quality of key infrastructure services, a 
fragile and underdeveloped financial system, and strong perceptions of contracting and 
regulatory uncertainty.  The private sector has time and again identified corruption and 
macroeconomic instability as two major impediments to a good investment climate in the 
Philippines. Costs of electricity and security issues are also important factors.   
 
Chart 5 Gross Capital Formation as Percent of GDP 
 
 
 
Aside from local investments experiencing a down trend, the country has also not fared well in 
terms of foreign direct investments. Chart 6 compares FDI inflows to the Philippines with flows 
to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam from the mid-1970s up to the year 
2007.  The figure shows that huge differences are evident in FDI inflows to the ASEAN 6 
countries with the Philippines receiving the lowest level of FDI inflows particularly in the 1990s 
and the 2000s. Table 5 present FDI as percentage of GDP in these countries. Except for 
Indonesia, the Philippines again fared badly.  FDI studies show that the most important 
determinants on the ability of countries to attract FDI relate to the investment climate 
(particularly the FDI regime and the effectiveness of FDI promotion), the economic 
competitiveness of the country, and its growth prospects (FIAS, WB, and IFC, 2005).  The 
Philippines has lagged behind in many competitiveness indicators. Table 6 shows the country’s 
performance in the Global Competitiveness report where it failed to improve its ranking in two 
of three major indicators.
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Table 4 Gross Capital Formation as Percentage of GDP 
Southeast Asia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Brunei Darussalam a … … … … … 13.1 14.4 21.3 15.1 13.5 11.4 10.4 12.9 
 Cambodia 14.3 14.5 14.8 11.8 16.7 16.9 18.5 18.1 20.1 16.2 18.5 20.6 20.8 
 Indonesia 31.9 30.7 31.8 16.8 11.4 22.2 22.0 21.4 25.6 24.1 25.1 25.4 24.9 
 Lao PDR … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
 Malaysia 43.6 41.5 43.0 26.7 22.4 26.9 24.4 24.8 22.8 23.0 20.0 20.5 21.7 
 Myanmar 14.2 12.3 12.5 12.4 13.4 12.4 11.6 10.1 11.0 12.2 13.2 13.8 … 
 Philippines   22.5 24.0 24.8 20.3 18.8 21.2 19.0 17.7 16.8 16.7 14.6 14.5 15.4 
 Singapore 34.5 35.4 38.7 31.1 32.2 33.3 26.5 23.7 16.0 21.8 20.2 20.1 20.7 
 Thailand 42.1 41.8 33.7 20.4 20.5 22.8 24.1 23.8 25.0 26.8 31.4 28.4 26.6 
 Viet Nam  27.1 28.1 28.3 29.0 27.6 29.6 31.2 33.2 35.4 35.5 35.6 36.8 43.1 
Source: ADB Outlook Indicators 2009 
 
Table 5: ASEAN: FDI as percentage of GDP 
Southeast Asia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Brunei Darussalam a … … … … … … 1.3 4.0 1.7 1.0 1.8 0.8 … 
Cambodia  4.7 8.3 5.5 7.0 6.4 4.0 3.7 3.5 1.8 2.4 5.9 6.6 10.0 
Indonesia 2.2 2.7 2.2 -0.3 -1.3 -2.8 -1.9 0.1 -0.3 0.7 2.9 1.3 1.6 
Lao PDR   5.4 8.5 4.9 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.0 5.4 7.9 
Malaysia 4.7 5.0 5.1 3.0 4.9 4.0 0.6 3.2 2.2 3.7 2.9 3.9 4.5 
Myanmar … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
Philippines 2.0 1.8 1.5 3.5 1.6 3.0 0.3 2.0 0.6 0.8 1.9 2.5 2.0 
Singapore 13.7 10.5 14.3 8.9 20.1 17.8 18.2 8.2 12.5 18.2 11.6 18.1 15.0 
Thailand 1.2 1.3 2.6 6.5 5.0 2.7 4.4 2.6 3.7 3.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Viet Nam  8.6 9.7 8.3 6.1 4.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.7 4.0 9.8 
Source: ADB Outlook Indicators 2009 
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Chart 6: FDI Inflows to ASEAN 6 (in million US$) 
 
Source: UNCTAD FDI Indicators (World Investment Report 2008) as cited by Aldaba &Aldaba (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Competitiveness Indicators Rankings for Selected Southeast Asian Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2003-2004 and 2008-2009 as cited by  
Aldaba & Aldaba (2009) 
 
 
The World Bank’s doing business indicators showed the same concerns on costs, complexity, and 
uncertainty in contract enforcement. Table 7 shows a comparison of the business costs indicators for the 
Philippines and its East Asian neighbors. The table reveals that in general, the Philippines along with 
Indonesia, performed significantly below the other East Asian countries in terms of corruption-related 
indicators. Between 2004 and 2009, improvements are observed for time to start a business and time to 
enforce a contract for the Philippines and number of start-up procedures, time to start a business and cost 
to register business for Indonesia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Growth 
Competitiveness Index 
Macro Environment 
Index 
Public Institution Index 
 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
Malaysia 29 21 27 38 34 30 
Thailand 32 34 26 41 37 57 
Philippines 66 71 60 53 85 105 
Indonesia 72 55 64 72 76 68 
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Table 7: Cost of Doing Business Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2005 and 2010 (http://www.doingbusiness.org) 
 
4. Perennial Fiscal Deficits  
 
The government has been confronted by fiscal deficits since the East Asian Financial crisis.  It 
only recovered in 2005 when it reformed the valued added tax system. Because of this fiscal 
situation, government’s provision of infrastructure and social services had been immensely 
affected.  Table 8 and Chart 6 show that since 1998, the government has failed to balance the 
budget.  Table 9 shows the Outstanding debt of government as percentage of GDP.  It was in a 
fragile position in 2003 and 2004 when the ratio reached around 80%.    The gravity of the fiscal 
problem is due to the fact that the post-Asian crisis economic recovery from 1999 to 2005 had 
surprisingly failed to improve tax effort, and conversely worsened it (Lim 2009). The tax effort 
peaked at more than 17% of GDP in 1996 and 1997 consistently fell after that and bottomed at 
12.4% in 2004 (Table 9). This improved to around 14.3% in 2006 mainly due to the expanded 
coverage and higher value-added tax rate (raised from 10% to 12%). But the tax effort 
deteriorated again in 2007 to the present. 
Chart 6: Fiscal Balance as Percent of GDP 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Outlook Indicators 2009 
Country Number of 
start-up 
procedures 
Time to start 
a business 
(days) 
 
Cost to 
register 
business 
(% of GNI 
pc) 
Procedures 
to enforce a 
contract 
Time to 
enforce a 
contract 
(days) 
Rigidity of 
employment 
index: 0 
(less rigid) to 
100 (very 
rigid) 
 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
Philippines 15 15 60 52 25.4 28.2 37 37 862 842 29 29 
PRChina 13 14 48 37 15.9 4.9 35 34 406 406 28 31 
Malaysia 9 9 30 11 25.1 11.9 30 30 600 585 10 10 
Hong Kong 5 3 11 6 3.4 1.8 24 24 211 280 0 0 
Indonesia 12 9 151 60 131 26 39 39 570 570 40 40 
S Korea 10 8 17 14 15.7 14.7 35 35 230 230 27 38 
Singapore 7 3 8 3 1 0.7 21 21 120 150 0 0 
Thailand 8 7 33 32 6.7 6.3 35 35 479 479 11 11 
Vietnam 11 11 56 50 30.6 13.3 34 34 356 295 33 21 
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Table 8: National Government Cash Budget: Revenues, Expenditure and National Government Balance 
Item 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
In million pesos                           
Revenues 410449 471843 462515 478502 514762 567481 578406 639737 706718 816159 979638 1136560 1202905 
  of which: Tax 
Revenues 367894 412165 416585 431686 460034 493608 507637 550468 604964 705615 859857 932937 1049179 
Expenditures 404193 470279 512496 590160 648974 714504 789147 839605 893775 962937 1044429 1149001 1271022 
  of which: 
Interest 
Payments 76522 77971 99792 106290 140894 181601 185861 226408 260901 299800 310108 267800 272218 
Surplus (Deficit) 6256 1564 -49981 -111658 -134212 -147023 -210741 -199868 -187057 -146778 -64791 -12441 -68117 
as % of GDP 
             
Revenues 18.90 19.44 17.35 16.07 15.34 15.63 14.59 14.82 14.51 14.99 16.24 17.07 16.04 
  of which: Tax 
Revenues 16.94 16.98 15.63 14.50 13.71 13.59 12.81 12.75 12.42 12.96 14.25 14.01 13.99 
Expenditures 18.61 19.38 19.23 19.82 19.35 19.68 19.91 19.45 18.35 17.69 17.31 17.26 16.95 
  of which: 
Interest 
Payments 3.52 3.21 3.74 3.57 4.20 5.00 4.69 5.25 5.36 5.51 5.14 4.02 3.63 
Surplus (Deficit) 0.29 0.06 -1.88 -3.75 -4.00 -4.05 -5.32 -4.63 -3.84 -2.70 -1.07 -0.19 -0.91 
Source:   Bureau of 
Treasury              
 
 
Table 9: National Government Outstanding Debt 
  
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total (in Billion Pesos) 1155.2 1350.6 1496.2 1775.4 2166.7 2384.9 2815.5 3355.1 3812.0 3888.2 3851.5 3712.5 4220.9 
As % of GDP 
                          
T O T A L  53.19 55.65 56.14 59.64 64.59 65.67 71.03 77.73 78.25 71.42 63.84 55.77 56.30 
Domestic Debt  34.17 30.89 31.93 32.87 31.84 34.36 37.12 39.47 41.08 39.76 35.71 33.07 32.20 
NG Direct  33.12 29.67 31.02 32.18 31.27 33.98 36.91 39.42 41.03 39.71 35.67 33.03 32.17 
of which Gov't Securities  32.44 29.06 29.56 30.85 30.81 33.55 36.51 39.06 40.45 39.20 35.33 32.73 31.99 
Assumed  1.05 1.22 0.91 0.68 0.57 0.38 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Foreign Debt  19.02 24.76 24.21 26.77 32.75 31.32 33.91 38.26 37.17 31.67 28.14 22.70 24.09 
NG Direct  14.31 18.70 18.21 18.19 19.30 17.26 17.80 18.90 17.27 12.92 11.18 9.22 10.58 
Assumed  0.72 0.75 0.57 0.44 0.40 0.32 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Foreign Denom. Securities  3.99 5.31 5.43 8.14 13.04 13.73 15.87 19.17 19.79 18.68 16.94 13.48 13.51 
Source: Bureau of Treasury              
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5. Exports getting to be less diversified 
While exports still comprise the largest component of GDP at around 42% in 2007, this has 
declined in recent years from a high of 55% in 2000.  In addition, exports have become less 
diversified as can be seen in Chart 8, making the economy more vulnerable to crisis situations in 
export destination countries. 
 
Chart 7: Trade as Percentage of GDP (1990-2007) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2009, World Bank as cited in Aldaba (forthcoming) 
 
Chart 8 presents the structure of exports by 2-digit level PSIC. In 1988, 60% of our exports 
consisted of electrical machinery & apparatus (22%), food and beverages (17%), and wearing 
apparel and textile (21%). Over the years, however, the Philippine export base has become less 
diversified.  In 2006, 69% of the country’s exports relied on only one sector: machinery 
equipment & transport which in 2006. Meanwhile, the shares of traditional exports such as food 
and beverages along with wearing apparel and textile declined to 3% and 7%, respectively.   
Chart 8: Merchandise Export Structure 1988 and 2006 
 
 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, National Statistics Office as cited in Aldaba (forthcoming)
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Table 10: Exports as Percentage of GDP 
Southeast Asia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Brunei Darussalam a 59.7 59.9 57.2 50.5 55.8 67.4 69.5 67.1 69.3 68.8 70.2 71.8 67.7 
 Cambodia 31.2 25.4 33.7 31.8 37.2 49.9 52.7 55.4 56.5 63.6 64.1 68.6 65.3 
 Indonesia 26.3 25.8 27.9 53.0 35.5 41.0 38.2 32.7 30.5 32.2 34.1 31.0 29.4 
 Lao PDR … … … … … … … … … … … … … 
 Malaysia 94.1 91.6 93.3 115.7 121.3 119.8 110.4 108.3 106.9 115.4 117.5 116.5 110.5 
 Myanmar 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 … 
 Philippines   36.4 40.5 49.0 52.2 51.5 55.4 49.2 50.2 49.6 50.9 47.6 47.3 42.5 
 Singapore 187.0 181.6 175.2 172.7 183.9 195.6 191.6 192.3 212.5 224.4 236.4 243.4 230.2 
 Thailand 41.8 39.3 48.0 58.9 58.3 66.8 65.9 64.2 65.7 70.7 73.6 73.7 73.2 
 Viet Nam  32.8 40.9 43.1 44.8 50.0 55.0 54.6 56.8 59.3 65.7 69.4 73.6 76.9 
Source: ADB Outlook Indicators 2009 
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6. Poverty and Labour Market Woes Amidst Moderate Growth  
For the past twenty years, the twin problems of unemployment and underemployment 
have haunted the economy. Some 1.3 to 1.5 million Filipinos join the labor force every 
year. Despite the exodus of Filipinos to work abroad, official unemployment rates remain 
high by East Asian standards.  Indonesia is the only other country with unemployment 
rates in the higher single digits as the Philippines (Table 11).   
Table 11:  Unemployment Rates in East Asia, 2003-2007 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
China 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 
Hongkong 7.9 6.8 5.6 4.8 4.0 
Indonesia 9.5 9.9 11.2 10.3 9.1 
Malaysia 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.1 
Philippines* 11.3 11.8 11.5 8.0 7.3 
Singapore 4.0 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.1 
South Korea 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 
Taiwan 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.9 
Thailand 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 
* The official definition of unemployment was changed in 2006 resulting in lower rates 
Source:  ADB Outlook 2008 
 
Official underemployment rates are seen to reflect the existence of low quality jobs and 
they have remained relatively high for the past fifteen years hovering from 16-22% (see 
figure below). This is consistent with the results of the 2008 Informal Sector Survey of 
the National Statistics Office (NSO) which showed that there were about 10.5 million 
informal sector operators in the country with almost 90% as self employed workers.   Not 
surprisingly, ADB researchers Hasan and Jandoc (2009) note that the share of 
employment in manufacturing, the sector where most quality permanent jobs are 
generated has been stagnant and it is the services sector that has “absorbed” the shift of 
employment from agriculture. The fastest-growing job type is not permanent wage 
employment but casual wage jobs and that there is weak growth in wages and earnings 
for workers in general. 
      
Chart 9 Unemployment Rates, 1995-2009 
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     Source: National Statistics Office 
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Unemployment and underemployment of the vast majority of our citizens contribute greatly 
to their impoverishment. Poverty incidence among households increased from 24.4% in 2003 
to 26.9% in 2006 and the number of poor families increased from 4.02 million in 2003 to 
4.68 million in 2006.  The headcount index increased from 30.0% in 2003 to 32.9% in 2006 
and the number of poor people from 23.8 million in 2003 to 27.6 million in 2006. Self-Rated 
Poverty3 has ranged from 50%-52% for most of 2008, peaking at 59% (estimated 10.6 
million people) in the 2nd quarter.  Aside from high unemployment and underemployment 
rates, the labour market is also experiencing a high rate of overseas migration.  This is a 
rationale response of a segment of the labour force to the unavailable supply of quality jobs 
in the country as discussed above. 
 
 
B.   Macroeconomic Impact of the Global Crisis 
 
The immediate impact of the tight liquidity in global capital markets was a rise in the price of 
risk measured by bond spreads and a sharp drop in equity prices. Foreign currency 
denominated government bond spread for the Philippines jumped from 155 basis points in 
June 2007 to 549 basis points in November 2008 and the Philippine stock exchange index 
fell by 24 percent between July 2008 and January 2009 (Yap et al, 2009). The following 
discusses the medium term macroeconomic impact of the GFC: 
 
 1. The Impact on Over-all Economic Growth 
 
The more insidious, long-term consequence of the Global Financial Crisis has been the 
downsizing of the real economy as the economies of the biggest trading partners like the 
United States, Japan, and Europe underwent contraction. This has had profound effects on 
the Philippine manufacturing sector, particularly the export sub-sector. Running data for 
2009 indicate some contractionary pressures on the Philippine economy, especially in the 
manufacturing sector. Table 12 shows a decline in the Producer Price Index (PPI) from 2008 
to the first half of 2009.  
 
 
Table 12. Producer Price Index for Manufacturing, Philippines (2000=100) 
Particulars 2007 2008 2009* 
Total manufacturing 168.40 175.25 172.3 
Annual percentage change 0.8 4.1 (0.2) 
*Running data from January to July 2009. 
Source: Monthly Integrated Survey of Selected Industries (MISSI), National Statistics Office (NSO) 
 
 
                                                 
3
 An approach measuring poverty incidence through a random survey of households (heads) which identify 
themselves as being poor; in the Philippines, this was pioneered by the Social Weather Stations 
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Table 13. National Accounts of the Philippines, at constant 1985 prices, Q-on-Q changes, Q1 
2007~Q3 2009 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, February 2010 
 
 
Both Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exhibit a general 
downward trend over the last three (3) full years from Q1 2007 save for the spike in Q2 2007 
(Table 13). But while growth in 2009 was remarkably weak in Q1 as the world economy began 
to feel the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, it was still positive, unlike that of many other 
countries in Asia. Admittedly, though, were it not for remittances – a major item in GNP (which 
treads a higher growth path than GDP) – it is likely that the economy would have fared much 
worse. 
 
After a relatively strong performance in the third quarter of 2008 the industrial sector registered 
negative growth for the first three quarters of 2009. Agriculture, fishery and forestry, while still 
in positive territory, went down to almost zero growth in Q2 2009 although it recovered to above 
1% in the following quarter. This would impact most adversely on rural poverty and hunger, as 
the majority of the population are still found in the countryside and where rural families are 
dependent on farm-based incomes. The service sector has started to grow after a dip in the last 
quarter 2008 which tends to confirm the consumption-driven nature of the Philippine economy, 
as more jobs open up in the service sector, which deals largely with traded goods and services, in 
contrast with production-related activities in industry and agriculture. Overall, however, the 
Philippine economy registered positive growth in 2008 at 4.6% and 2009 at 0.9%, at a time when 
a contraction was considered inevitable in many places in the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Particulars 
2007 2008 2009 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Gross 
National 
Product 
6.4  9.8  9.1  6.0  6.4  5.3  6.2  6.7  3.1  3.2  3.5  2.4  
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
6.9  8.3  7.1  6.4  3.9  4.2  4.6  2.9  0.6  0.8  0.8  1.8  
Gross 
National 
Product (in 
millions of 
PhP) 
347,192 375,026 362,466 410,905 369,494 394,787 385,063 438,454 380,901 407,432 398,422 449,173 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product (in 
millions of 
PhP) 
320,326 339,218 328,795 378,154 332,890 353,331 343,784 388,948 334,866 356,050 346,405 395,942 
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Chart 10. National Income Accounts (GNP, GDP) by source or industry sector, 
percentage change, Y-O-Y, at constant 1985 prices 
 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, August 2009 
 
2. Prices and Inflation 
 
Table 14 shows that inflationary pressures were built up during early 2008 even before the 
crisis erupted, as oil and food prices fuelled the increase in prices. Significant reductions in 
inflation were realized though in 2009, as it went down to single digits at the beginning of 
that year after reaching double digits in 2008.  Headline inflation settled at 3.35% in 2009 
from a high of 9.29% in 2008.  The low inflation in 2009 mainly due to base effects and 
partially to the downturn of economic activity gave the monetary authorities enough 
flexibility to continually reduce interest rates. 
 
Table 14. Simple (Headline) Inflation, Philippines, 2000=100,  
% changes Y-o-Y, 2007~2009 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average 
2007 3.90 2.60 2.20 2.30 2.40 2.30 2.60 2.40 2.70 2.70 3.20 3.90 2.77 
2008 4.90 5.40 6.40 8.30 9.50 11.40 12.30 12.40 11.80 11.20 9.90 8.00 9.29 
2009 7.10 7.30 6.40 4.80 3.30 1.50 0.20 0.10 0.70 1.60 2.80 4.40 3.35 
 
Source of basic data: NSO, BSP-DER. 
 
3. Trade (Exports and Imports) 
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As early as end-2008, when the Crisis began to unfold, many observers had correctly 
predicted that the Philippines, particularly its export sector, would suffer as a result. The 
country’s exports plunged by 21.9 percent to $38.33 billion in 2009 from $49.078 billion in 
2008 as demand for locally-made products declined substantially due to the global financial 
crisis. Philippine exports started to decelerate in September 2008 and reached its lowest point 
in December of that year, decreasing to -40.3%. Electronic products, the country’s top export 
fell 22% in 2009 and apparel and clothing, the second top export declined 17.8%.  However, 
total exports recovered in November 2009, with a positive growth of 5.7 percent and then 
surged 23.6% in December. 
 
Chart 11.Exports Growth, Philippines, January 2008 ~ December 2009 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
 
4. FDI and Balance of Payments 
 
The balance-of-payments (BOP) position registered an overall surplus of US$4.17 billion for 
Q3 2009. For the month of October 2009 alone, the figure is double that of the same period 
from the previous year, reversing a deficit of US$1.2 billion and posting a surplus of US$896 
million. This latest BOP figure also represents an improvement from that of the previous 
month of September 2009, which was recorded at US$502 million, The surplus was created 
in part by the sale of US$1 billion in global bonds, the proceeds of which will be used to help 
the government fill in an estimated PhP300 billion budget gap for 2009 and settle maturing 
obligations. The Philippines had also borrowed US$250 million from the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) to meet increased spending needs as a pump-priming measure in the wake of 
the twin disasters of typhoons “Ondoy” and “Pepeng” that visited the country in September.4 
These measures have helped to improve net capital inflows. However, in November, the 
country incurred a BOP deficit of $93 million, a reversal of the previous month’s $896-
                                                 
4
 “10-month BOP surplus hits $4.17B,” by Michelle Remo, in Philippine Daily Inquirer,17 November 2009. 
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million surplus. Because of this, the 11-month surplus was reduced to $4.080 billion from the 
end-October’s $4.173-billion. 
The Philippines’ net inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI) amounting to US$82 million 
was posted in November 2009. On a cumulative basis, the eleven-month FDI level amounted 
to US$1.4 billion, higher by 5.5 percent than the year-ago level. Net equity capital inflows, 
totalling nearly US$1.4 billion, were up by 12.8 percent compared to the US$1.2 billion level 
recorded in the same period in 2008. In particular, gross equity capital placements from 
January to November 2009 reached US$1.5 billion, with the bulk of investments coming 
from the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands. Recipient industries included 
manufacturing, real estate, construction, services, financial intermediation, mining, 
trade/commerce, and transportation/ storage/communications. 
5. Exchange Rates and Gross International Reserves 
 
The Philippine peso normally tracks the weakening or strengthening of the US dollar in the 
global market. After much volatility from 2004 to early 2007, a relatively stable exchange-
rate regime has been in place from mid-2007 to the present, fluctuating in the ranges from 
P45 to P47 per US dollar. This relative stability in the exchange rate has helped the 
Philippines keep inflationary pressures in check. Table 17 summarizes the exchange rate 
averages and end-of-period numbers against the US dollar throughout the years of the Arroyo 
administration’s second term in office. 
 
Table 16 shows the country’s international reserve position at the close of each period 
indicated. To its credit, the BSP under the guidance of the Monetary Board enacted policies 
to ensure a steady build-up of the reserve position even prior to the start of the Crisis. The 
central bank’s gross international reserves (GIR), which serve as the country’s premier line 
of defense against foreign exchange shocks, grew to a fresh record high of $42.3 billion. At 
its end-September level, the foreign exchange stock was enough to cover 7.8 months worth 
of imports and payments of services and income. It was also equivalent to 7.6 times the 
country’s short-term external debt based on original maturity.   
 
Lim (2009) notes that in 2008, the net outflows from portfolio investments and the trade 
deficit were outpaced by overseas remittances of OFWs.  He adds that these remittance 
inflows usually went beyond 10% of GDP, so that when the global financial and economic 
meltdown started, the massive capital outflows did not lead to a very strong reduction in 
foreign exchange reserves in 2008.  
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Table 15. Foreign Direct Investment (BOP concept), in millions of US dollars, 2008~2009 
*Preliminary 
**Year-to-date (September) 
Source: BSP 
 
 
Table 16. International Reserve Levels, Philippines, at end of period indicated (in millions of US dollars) 
 
   
2008 2009 
      March April May June July August September October November December January February March April May June 
Reserve Position in the 
Fund 144.06 142.32 141.97 143.20 142.08 137.61 135.55 130.46 130.03 135.02 130.78 128.63 131.06 131.31 135.70 136.15 
  Gold 3,834.39 3,584.75 3,795.61 3,962.94 3,904.11 3,568.84 3,848.44 3,516.51 3,808.98 4,357.93 4,567.67 4,687.30 4,547.47 4,422.69 4,879.20 4,711.71 
  SDRs 0.08 13.37 12.61 12.71 12.61 11.49 11.32 10.90 10.25 10.65 10.31 9.91 10.10 10.11 10.33 10.35 
  
Foreign 
Investments 32,274.85 32,228.27 31,884.16 32,223.58 32,545.36 32,672.28 32,292.70 31,832.29 32,374.42 32,065.86 33,682.15 33,213.97 33,414.96 33,941.45 33,810.59 33,937.41 
  Foreign Exchange 370.63 386.86 398.77 369.85 296.83 352.50 409.44 461.42 504.47 981.36 857.30 884.76 937.69 810.69 753.56 693.92 
    
                
GIR   36,624.01 36,355.57 36,233.12 36,712.28 36,900.99 36,742.72 36,697.45 35,951.58 36,828.15 37,550.82 39,248.21 38,924.57 39,041.28 39,316.25 39,589.38 39,489.54 
  
Annual Growth 
Rate (in %) 48.4 44.9 41.5 39.2 31.7 20.5 18.8 10.6 12.6 11.3 12.8 7.3 6.6 8.1 9.3 7.6 
    
                
Less:                   
Item 2008 2009* Cumulative (Jan-Sep) Y-o-Y Growth 
rate** 
 J F M A M J J A S J F M A M J J A S 2007 2008 2009* 2008 2009 
Non-resident 
investment in RP -4 88 135 217 23 146 321 51 211 33 231 -226 599 388 
-
133 347 36 -6 2617 1188 1269 -54.6 6.8 
 
                       
Equity capital 45 35 97 36 15 154 600 19 43 6 10 32 627 319 2 315 22 -14 1856 1044 1319 -43.8 26.3 
     Placements 78 68 103 51 42 167 606 39 54 26 14 33 632 322 34 326 53 17 1980 1208 1457 -39.0 20.6 
     Withdrawals 33 33 6 15 27 13 6 20 11 20 4 1 5 3 32 11 31 31 124 164 138 32.3 -15.9 
 
                       
Reinvested earnings, 
net -83 -73 -89 16 21 24 92 16 1 17 13 10 17 13 18 -14 30 10 412 -75 114 -118.2 252.0 
                        
Other capital, net 34 126 127 165 -13 -32 -371 16 167 10 208 -268 -45 56 -153 46 -16 -2 349 219 -164 -37.2 -174.9 
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  Liabilities 21.44 27.46 21.84 506.01 510.19 715.19 921.37 1,528.39 1,527.97 1,514.68 1,521.05 1,027.24 1,534.73 1,543.39 1,045.26 1,023.97 
    
                
NIR 1   36,602.57 36,328.11 36,211.28 36,206.27 36,390.80 36,027.53 35,776.08 34,423.19 35,300.18 36,036.14 37,727.16 37,897.33 37,506.55 37,772.86 38,544.12 38,465.57 
Reserve Adequacy 
Measures                 
  Import Cover 2 5.96 5.86 5.78 5.77 5.69 5.62 5.56 5.47 5.68 5.95 6.36 6.46 6.66 6.91 7.14 7.29 
  
Short-Term 
External Debt 
Cover  
                
   
Original 
Maturity 550.65 546.62 544.78 417.33 419.47 408.39 442.19 404.00 413.85 536.36 560.61 598.75 600.64 604.87 609.07 686.42 
   
Residual 
Maturity 3 289.88 296.20 299.08 263.74 264.83 264.30 283.05 260.33 269.05 324.16 337.71 318.09 315.56 315.49 317.20 344.32 
Memo Item                 
  
Percent Share to 
Total GIR 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
   
Reserve 
Position in 
the Fund 
0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 
   Gold 10.47 9.86 10.48 10.79 10.58 9.71 10.49 9.78 10.34 11.61 11.64 12.04 11.65 11.25 12.32 11.93 
   SDRs 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   
Foreign 
Investments 88.12 88.65 88.00 87.77 88.20 88.92 88.00 88.54 87.91 85.39 85.82 85.33 85.59 86.33 85.40 85.94 
    
Foreign 
Exchange 1.01 1.06 1.10 1.01 0.80 0.96 1.12 1.28 1.37 2.61 2.18 2.27 2.40 2.06 1.90 1.76 
1
 Inclusive of gold monetization and revaluation of reserve assets and reserve-related liabilties which are excluded in the calculation of the balance of payments (BOP).  Net International Reserves (NIR) 
  
refer to the difference  between Gross International Reserves (GIR) and the total of the Bangko Sentral's short-term liabilities and the Use of Fund Credits (UFC).  UFC  refers to the sum of outstanding drawings from the IMF under various policies  and facilities, other than drawings under 
the reserve tranche. 
2
 Number of months of average imports of goods and payment of services and income that can be financed by reserves.      
3
 Refers to adequacy of reserves to cover outstanding short-term external debt based on original maturity plus principal payments on medium- and long-term loans of the public and private sectors falling duein the next 12 months. 
r
 Revised based on the final International Reserves (IR) report as of end-September 2009. 
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Table 17. Philippine pesos per US dollar, daily average per month and end-of-period,  
2004~ 2009 
Daily average per month 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
January 55.5261 55.7662 52.6171 48.9143 40.9381 47.2072 
February 56.0696 54.8128 51.8168 48.3814 40.6711 47.5846 
March 56.3029 54.4402 51.2189 48.5172 41.2524 48.4580 
April 55.9039 54.4918 51.3597 47.8224 41.8196 48.2165 
May 55.8453 54.3411 52.1273 46.8141 42.9020 47.5242 
June 55.9848 55.1790 53.1567 46.1602 44.2806 47.9053 
July 55.9527 56.0062 52.3976 45.6251 44.9563 48.1460 
August 55.8342 55.9523 51.3618 46.0737 44.8769 48.1607 
September 56.2132 56.1562 50.4012 46.1315 46.6922 48.1394 
October 56.3414 55.7077 50.0038 44.3803 48.0252 46.8513 
November 56.3221 54.5606 49.8434 43.2176 49.1862 47.0324 
December 56.1828 53.6118 49.4670 41.7429 48.0942  
Average 56.0399 55.0855 51.3143 46.1484 44.4746 47.7478 
%Appreciation(+)/Depreciation(-) -3.2800 1.7300 7.3500 11.1900 3.7600 -9.9600 
Volatility** 0.2801 0.8396 1.1536 2.0991 2.9141 0.5244 
 
      
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
End-of-Period 
      
January 56.0850 55.1120 52.3360 49.0270 40.6500 47.0760 
February 56.2750 54.7170 54.0880 48.2870 40.3600 48.2360 
March 56.3570 54.7930 51.2840 48.2620 41.8680 48.4190 
April 55.8580 54.3540 51.8260 47.5100 41.1920 48.7040 
May 55.8370 54.3670 52.6540 46.2690 43.8820 47.5480 
June 56.1810 55.9190 53.5870 46.3290 44.7560 48.3080 
July 56.0090 56.1050 51.6240 45.6110 44.1400 48.1210 
August 56.2160 56.1600 50.9370 46.6950 45.6850 48.9060 
September 56.3360 56.0550 50.3870 45.0630 46.9170 47.5920 
October 56.3510 55.0600 49.8050 43.9470 48.7460 47.7320 
November 56.2310 53.9990 49.7630 42.7980 48.8800 46.7520 
December 56.2670 53.0670 49.1320 41.4010 47.4850  
Source: BSP, 2009 
 
 
6. Remittances 
Remittances by overseas Filipino workers (OFW) grew 5.6% in 2009 proving its resilience to 
the global economic downturn.   Data from the BSP showed that money sent reached a 
record $1.6 billion in December, an 11.4% growth from the same month in 2008. This was 
the highest growth recorded for 2009 and the highest year-on-year expansion since October 
2008.This brought the country's total remittance inflows for 2009 to $17.3 billion. According 
to the the BSP, the country's major sources of remittances were the United States, Canada, 
Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Italy, and 
Germany. It also credited the steady growth in remittances to the sustained deployment of 
Crafting Coherent Policy Responses to the Crisis in the Philippines (DRAFT: 03 March 2010) 
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skilled Filipino workers and increased access of OFWs to formal money transfer channels. 
Last year there was increased demand for engineers, medical practitioners, and teachers. As 
OFWs are spread around the globe, this diversification has also contributed to the resilience 
of remittance flows.  The downside of remittances is some evidence of growing dependency 
among the youth in migrant households. (PIMA Foundation, 2009). 
Net factor Income from Abroad (NFIA) which are mostly remittances has kept the economy 
afloat in 2008 and early 2009 as could be seen in the chart below from Lim (2009). 
 
Chart 13 Contribution to GNP: GDP and NFIA 
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Source: NSCB as  cited by Lim (2009) 
 
7. Equity Markets and Portfolio Investments 
 
Other economic indicators highlight the Philippines’ resilience in the current adverse 
environment. BSP reported “hot money” inflows totalling US$229.14 million in the first 
nine months alone of 2009, a reversal from year-ago net outflows of US$889.15 million. 
Updated figures show that in the first two weeks of October 2009, the foreign fund 
managers opted to stay invested in the Philippines as hot-money inflows totalled 
US$162.65 million, also a reversal from year-ago net outflows of US$42.70 million. This 
resulted in net hot-money an inflow of US$389.94 million from year-to-date and a 
turnaround from year-ago outflows reaching US$897.83 million. BSP data showed that 
82 percent of the gross portfolio investment inflows reported in September entered the 
stock market, the rest into peso-denominated securities and time deposits. Gross portfolio 
inflows totalled $685.30 million in September, outflows were $638.35 million. Foreign 
portfolio investment inflows hit US$4.024 billion in the eight-month period against 
outflows of US$3.842 billion. A month earlier, the BSP reported that foreign portfolio 
inflows amounted to $384.96 million in August against outflows of $467.87 million. The 
investments, which came from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore 
and Luxembourg, were invested mainly in the stock market.
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In a related development, companies listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) saw 
aggregate profits grow significantly during the first six months of the current year, and 
analysts said the rest of 2009 will likely be better. The PSE, in a statement, said the 
combined net earnings of 229 listed firms increased by 46.3% to P193.43 billion from a 
year earlier. Total revenues likewise went up by 4.8% to P1.32 trillion. A total of 164 
companies ended the January-June period in the black while 65 firms recorded net losses, 
the PSE added. Ultimately, the improved real corporate performance – as opposed to 
stock price appreciation and increased market capitalization – of PSE-listed firms will 
result in improved investor-confidence in the local issuances, as evidenced by the 
stronger upward momentum of the Philippine Stock Index (PhiSIx) beginning in 
December of 2008 (Chart 14). 
Chart 14. Philippine Stock Index (PhiSIx), June 2007 ~ October 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image source: DB Knowledge Services, 2009 (http://www.dbresearch.de )  
8. Fiscal Balance 
 
The fiscal deficit of the National Government for 2009 was recorded at P298.5 billion, 
higher by P48.5 billion than the target of P250 billion and around 3.9 percent of GDP. 
The National Government incurred a deficit in December amounting to P26.0 billion.  
For the full year of 2009, revenue collections reached to P1,123.2 billion or P115.9 
billion lower than program. The shortfall in revenue collections is due to the 
underperformance by the Bureau of Internal Revenue by P48.2 billion, Bureau of 
Customs by P53.0 billion, and Other Offices by P24.6 billion. The Bureau of the 
Treasury, on the other hand, exceeded its collection target by P9.8 billion and registered a 
growth of 9.8% compared to the same period last year. The fall in revenues can also be 
attributed to slower economic activities and lower profitability of companies as a result of 
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the GFC.  National Government expenditures reached P1,421.7 billion for the year or 
67.4 billion below than program and grew by 12% over the same period last year.   This 
is despite the P 330 billion stimulus spending that it supposedly incurred for the year. 
 
Table 18 Fiscal Performance of the Republic of the Philippines  
January to December 2009 
(In Billion Pesos) 
 
 
Jan – Dec Actual Jan – Dec 
2009 
Programmed 
Program 
vs. 
Actual 
Percent 
Growth 
2008/2009 
2008 2009 
Surplus/(Deficit)  (68.1)  (298.5)  (250.0)  (48.5)  338.3  
Revenues  1,202.9  1,123.2  1,239.2  (115.9)  (6.6)  
Cash  1,144.2  1,071.3  1,183.9  (112.6)  (6.4)  
Non-Cash  58.7  51.9  55.3  (3.3)  (11.5)  
Expenditures  1,271.0  1,421.7  1,489.2  (67.4)  11.9  
Cash  1,212.3  1,369.8  1,433.9  (64.1)  13.0  
Non-Cash  58.7  51.9  55.3  (3.3)  (11.5)  
Source :Bureau of Treasury 
 
 
C. Labour and Social Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
  
1. Unemployment 
 
Even before the onslaught of the GFC, the country already experienced a relatively high 
unemployment rate in April 2008. During the crisis i.e. after September 2008, unemployment 
peaked in January 2009 but eventually eased up in October 2009 as signs of recovery 
emerged.    
 
  Table 19: Key Indicators 
 LFPR Unemp Underemp 
Jan '07 64.8 7.8 21.5 
Apr '07 64.5 7.4 18.9 
July '07 63.6 7.8 22 
Oct '07 63.2 6.3 18.1 
Jan '08 63.4 7.4 18.9 
Apr '08 63.2 8.0 19.8 
July '08 64.3 7.4 21.0 
Oct '08 63.7 6.8 17.5 
Jan '09 63.3 7.7 18.2 
Apr '09 64.0 7.5 18.9 
Jul '09 64.6 7.6 19.8 
Oct '09 64.0 7.1 19.4 
  Source: National Statistics Office 
 
 
 31
Chart 15: Unemployment rates, January 07 to October 09 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
 
In terms of regions, the National Capital Region, Calabarzon (IV-A) and Central Luzon (III), 
Ilocos (I) and Cebu (VII)  were the ones hit with relatively high unemployment rates.  Some 
of the export-oriented firms are based in these regions especially those within the export 
processing zones.  This is confirmed by anecdotes and case studies of workers retrenched 
from such firms as gathered by the ILO and ADB in Cavite, Batangas, Laguna and Cebu. 
(Lopez, 2009 and PIMA Foundation, 2009) 
  
Chart 16: Unemployment Rates by Region, January 09 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
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These unemployment statistics can be further bolstered by administrative data from the 
Department of Labour and Employment in terms of establishments reporting their displaced 
workers.  Table 20 shows that CALABARZON, NCR, Central Visayas and Central Luzon 
contributed more than 90% of the displaced workers from affected firms from Jauary to June 
2009. 
 
Table 20: Establishments Reporting Permanently Displaced Workers, January – June 2009 
 
 
In terms of educational attainment, workers having high school and college level education 
comprise more than 80% of the unemployed during the crisis period.  Unemployed college 
level workers increased its proportion faster relative to others in April 2009 as new graduates 
entered the labour force. 
 
Chart 17: Unemployed Workers by Educational Attainment 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
 33
 
With regard to age brackets, the youth, especially those aged 15-24 increased their share in 
the unemployed workforce during the crisis months January to July 2009.  While there are 
examples of teen-agers dropping out of school to help out their families in the FGDs 
conducted by PIMA foundation and ILO, many were also unsuccessful in finding work.   
 
Chart 18: Composition of Unemployed by Age  
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Source: National Statistics Office 
 
The female share in the jobless population also increased during the crisis months, January to 
July 2009. Many workers from the semi-conductor industry gravely affected by the crisis 
were women.  Again this was confirmed by the various female displaced workers in the  
FGDs conducted by PIMA-ILO and the ADB. 
 
Chart 19: Composition of Unemployed by Sex 
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2. The Discouraged Workers and Underemployment 
 
It is also noticeable that the LFPR also substantially declined in January 2009.  This might 
probably be due to the discouraged worker effect when workers displaced during the crisis 
continuously fail to find alternative work.  Most eventually would become self-employed and 
find jobs in the informal sector.  This is evidenced by the increase in underemployment from 
a low of 17.5% in October 2008 to a high of 19.8% in July 2009 (See Chart 21). Pulse Asia 
even claims that underemployment reached 35% in March 20008 during a media briefing 
done for the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (Ideas). 
 
  
Chart 20: Labour Force Participation Rate 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
 
 
Thus, underemployment was actually a bigger problem as many workers had no choice but to 
accept lower quality jobs if they want to avoid being jobless.  Notice that underemployment 
has plagued the labour market even before the crisis exploded.  However, from October 2008 
to July 2009, underemployment increased. This can be confirmed by anecdotes from the 
FGDs where the displaced workers turned to micro businesses, part time jobs like driving 
tricycles, becoming painters or engaging in laundry services (PIMA-ILO, 2009) 
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Chart 21: Underemployment Rates January 2007 – October 09 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
The quality of employment can also be gleaned from the composition of the employed in 
terms of the class of workers.  Note that during the crisis months from January to October 
2009 almost 40% of the employed were unpaid family workers and the self employed. 
Women who were laid off from their previous jobs usually supplemented their income by 
engaging in home-based businesses or part-time employment in jobs requiring lower skills 
than what they were trained for, i.e., domestic help, laundry services, baby-sitting, etc..  Men, 
on the other hand, were more likely to be able to find a job or engage in a business that 
utilized their skills i.e. tricycle driver, carpenter, painter, etc. 
 
Chart 22: Class of Workers 2009 
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       Source: National Statistics Office 
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In terms of sectors, most of the underemployed are found in the agriculture but during the 
crisis months, the services sector increased its share among the ranks of the underemployed.  
The services sector encompasses a diversity of sub-sectors, many of which are characterized 
by their nature of being micro-businesses and by their informality. Some of the micro 
businesses in the informal sector also suffered during the crisis especially those catering to 
the employees and workers of affected industries like Business Process Outsourcing and 
semi-conductors (Lopez, 2009) 
 
Chart 23: Underemployment in the Major Sectors 
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Source: National Statistics Office 
3. Poverty, Hunger and Risks of not Attaining MDG Targets 
 
Self Rated Poverty still at high levels 
 
Increased unemployment and underemployment among the labour force will eventually lead 
to higher poverty incidence.  According to the World Bank in its November Quarterly 
Report, poverty incidence is projected to increase by 1 to 1.5% at the minimum.  Crisis 
situations impoverish vulnerable workers already near the threshold as they lose their jobs or 
their incomes markedly decline. Household surveys by government to ascertain poverty 
levels are done every three years and the most recent one administered was last year.  
However, processed results will be released only late this year. 
 
Using a smaller sample size and self rating, the Social Weather Stations (SWS) is able to 
track down poverty quicker.  The following chart shows self rated poverty during the crisis 
months.   Self rated poverty has actually hovered around 50% although it reached a peak of 
59% in June 2008 during a period of double digit inflation resulting from the rice crisis and 
increasing prices of oil. 
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Chart 24: SWS Self Rated Poverty and Hunger Incidence, June 2007 to October 2009 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ju
n 
'07
Se
p '0
7
De
c'0
7
Ma
r '
08
Ju
n 
'08
Se
p '0
8
De
c '
08
Fe
b '
09
Ju
n 
'09
Se
p '0
9
Oc
t '0
9
Self Rated Poverty
Hunger Incidence
 
Source: National Statistics Office 
 
 
Because of the GFC, affected households devised various strategies to cope with 
displacement or decreased incomes.  One way of riding through the crisis was to reduce 
expenditures.  For example, another polling firm, Pulse Asia found that two in three Filipino 
households (66%) were spending less on food during the height of double digit inflation rates 
during mid-2008.  The immediate impact of reduced food consumption is hunger in the short 
run and malnutrition in the medium term. Hunger incidence according to the SWS survey 
(see Chart 24) peaked in December 2008, dipped in February 2009 but increased again to 
around 20% in June 2009.   
 
Other ways of belt tightening include cutting back on rice spending, electricity use, 
transportation costs, transport fuel, liquefied petroleum gas for cooking and cellphone loads.  
These were all mentioned in the various FGDs and local surveys done to assess the impact of 
the crisis. (Lopez, 2009; PIMA-ILO, 2009 and Yap et al, 2009).  The GFC has further 
dampened the likelihood that the country will be able to achieve targets 1 and 2 of the 
Millennium Development Goals i.e.eradicate extreme hunger and poverty. Another important 
coping mechanism utilized by households as confirmed by various studies is to reduce 
spending on education and health.    As a consequence, the MDG targets of achieving 
universal primary education and those related with achieving good health outcomes will be 
significantly affected.   
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4. Other Social Impacts 
The various FGDs and local surveys also mention cases of increased indebtedness of 
households as they try to smoothen consumption by borrowing from loan sharks and other 
informal lending institutions.  A household in a debt trap becomes more vulnerable to being 
poor. Often not mentioned in the literature are changes in “well- being” of the workers. For 
example, females in the support service sector in Cavite experienced anxiety and disruptions 
in their sleeping patterns. In several FGDs in Cavite, however, incidences of heavier 
drinking, gambling and truancy among teen-aged children were shared (Lopez, 2009) 
 
V.  Government Responses to the Crisis 
 
After the crash of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, emergency meetings within NEDA 
and among the Economic Managers provided the inputs towards the formulation of an Economic 
Resiliency Plan as instructed by President Arroyo.  In a major policy speech on October 22, 
2008, she outlined the key strategies and specific programmes that aim to cushion the economy 
from the Global Crisis particularly in terms of stimulus spending.  The over-all track was to 
pump prime the economy by frontloading infrastructure projects, expand social protection 
through the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps) and already current social 
programmes (SSS, GSIS, Philhealth), and assist the most affected sectors i.e. export firms and 
their workers and displaced OFWs. (The timeline of the Government’s response is elaborated in 
Annex A) 
 
The Economic Resiliency Plan or ERP is the country’s key response to the global financial crisis. 
Its aim was to cushion the impact of the GFC and jumpstart the economy through a mix of 
accelerated government spending, tax cuts and public-private sector investments in infrastructure 
projects. The ERP also hope to prepare the country for the eventual global upturn. The objectives 
were: 
 
- Ensure sustainable growth and attain the higher end of the growth targets; 
- Save and create as many jobs as possible 
- Protect the most vulnerable sectors – the poorest of the poor, returning OFWs, and 
workers in the export industries; 
- Ensure low and stable prices; and 
- Improve competitiveness in preparation for the global economic rebound.  
- Ensure sustainable growth and attain the higher end of the growth targets; 
 
In the early part of 2009, the President again delivered a policy speech (February, 9, 2009) which 
gave her audience more details of the Economic Resiliency Plan: 
 
- SSS to condone penalties and surcharges on loans of affected workers.  
- DOLE and OWWA to establish a stand-by fund for displaced seafarers and land-based 
OFWs as well as workers being laid off in export-oriented industries.  
- TESDA will implement training programs, training interventions specifically targeted for 
workers displaced in CALABARZON, Subic, Clark and Mactan.   
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- The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) will provide fuel subsidy to firms 
operating in the export processing zones that transport their workers to and from the 
zones.  
- The BSP also through the national government’s representative in the Monetary Board5 
to provide  liberal terms for rediscounting windows and allow the banks particularly the 
government financial institutions (GFIs) some flexibility on regulatory financial ratio 
compliance. 
- Government and industries to share information on industry employment, number of 
companies affected, number of workers affected either through retrenchment or flexible 
work arrangements, and other related information in order to come up with an accurate 
and reliable picture of the actual impact of the financial crisis to allow both government 
and industry to develop appropriate responses and interventions. DOLE will coordinate 
and share information with major industries and the business sector6. 
- Investments in infrastructure and social projects including those that will create “Green 
Collar Jobs”  
- Launching of NARS or mobilizing new and young nurses to rural areas 
 
The specific government responses were anchored on the following key policies and 
programmes: 
  
1. Monetary Policy 
 
A major objective is to ensure that there is enough liquidity and access to credit for firms to 
be able to survive the Crisis.  At the same time, inflation must be tempered so as not to add to 
the burden of vulnerable sectors in coping with the negative effects of the crisis.  The key 
agency responsible for this objective is the BSP, the regulatory body overseeing the banking 
and much of the financial services industries.  The BSP reduced its policy rates by a total of 
200 basis points from December 20087 aided by easing inflation which brought the overnight 
borrowing or reverse repurchase rate to 4% and the overnight lending or repurchase rate to 
6%. The BSP also reduced the regular reserve requirement by two percentage points and 
increased the rediscounting budget from P20 billion to P60 billion and liberalized access to 
the facility. It also maintained a policy of promoting a market-determined exchange rate with 
room for intervention to address sharp volatilities, maintaining a comfortable level of 
reserves and ensuring sustainability of the country’s external debt.  Finally, it has also been 
actively engaging with its regional peers in ASEAN and East Asia to share information, 
discuss emerging developments and pool resources particularly foreign exchange reserves. 
 
2. Emergency Employment 
 
The government as an employer of last resort, implemented policies and programmes to 
create jobs for targeted displaced workers.  It issued Executive Order 782, s 2009 mandating 
the allotment of 1.5% of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) of agency 
                                                 
5
 The BSP is autonomous from the Executive branch of government. 
6
 This was actually confirmed by Assistant Secretary Teresa Soriano who said that the President asked for the actual 
list of workers displaced and their profiles 
7
 The rates were reduced on the following dates: 18 December 2008; 29 January 2009; 12 February 2009; 5 March 
2009, 16 April 2009, 28 May 2009, 9 July 2009 
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budget for hiring of displaced workers or their dependents.  It has also “frontloaded” the 
infrastructure budget i.e. National agencies involved in building infrastructure must quickly 
spend the bulk of their budget, shift resources from slow to fast moving projects, and 
implement or scale up quick disbursing high impact projects.  These agencies include the 
Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Transportation and 
Communication, Department of Agriculture and the Department of Education. These projects 
are labour intensive and have high local value added, include accessibility facilities for the 
disabled; the construction, repair, or rehabilitation of irrigation systems; and the construction 
of local roads and asphalt overlay, among others.  Finally, the government launched the 
Comprehensive Livelihood and Emergency Program (CLEEP) which consisted of various 
programmes aimed at protecting the following vulnerable sectors: the poor and the hungry, 
returning OFWs who were laid off from work, workers in the export industry, and out-of 
school youth from the threats and consequences of reduced or lost income as a result of the 
economic crisis, by providing them with emergency employment, cash-for-work and other 
income-generating services and funding for livelihood projects.   
 
3. Social Protection Programs8 
 
The government also expanded several existing social protection programmes to mitigate the 
impact of the crisis on poor households.  Foremost among these is the Pantawid Pamilyang 
Pilipino Programme (4Ps). The 4Ps which started in 2008 is a conditional cash transfer 
programme in which the national government provides cash grant to extremely poor 
households to allow them to meet certain human development goals contingent on 
compliance with core responsibilities. The government is spending P15 billion for this 
programme which targets one million poor households nationwide.  Complementary to 4Ps is 
the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) which aims to 
establish a socio-economic database of poor households who will be beneficiaries of social 
protection programmes.  This system hopes to facilitate high quality information with public 
and private social protection stakeholders to prevent inclusion of non-poor and 
undercoverage or exclusion of the poor in social protection programmes. 
 
Another major social protection programme is the Philippine Health Insurance (PhilHealth) 
is the largest social protection institution in the Philippines. Around 66 % of the population is 
covered with the formal sector by almost 100% and the informal sector  by only 50% (Weber 
and Piechulek, 2009). Its mandate is to provide all citizens with the mechanism to gain 
financial access to health services, in combination with other government health programs. 
For the Crisis response, PhilHealth was mandated to increase its coverage and to improve its 
benefits to its members.  Other existing programmes which government claims to be part of 
the response include the Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran (SEA-K) Programme,  the 
Food for School Program and the Tindahan Natin and Family Access Cards. (a complete 
description of these programmes is found in Annex B). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Based on the replies of Undersecretary Alice Bala of DSWD and a paper by Undersecretary Lualhati Pablo of 
DSWD 
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4. Training for Work Scholarship Programs 
 
Spearheaded by TESDA, these scholarship programs targeted displaced workers within the 
country and OFWs and their dependents. A prime example is the Pangulong Gloria 
Scholarship, formerly known as the PGMA Training for Work Scholarship Program (PGMA-
TWSP) which was originally launched in May 2006. It was expanded under the ERP to cater 
to poor but deserving Filipinos.  Trainings are related to the following sectors - business 
process outsourcing, call centers, medical and legal transcription, animation, software 
development, health care, etc. 
 
5. Assistance to Displaced Overseas Filipino Workers 
 
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), has striven to guarantee safety nets for 
workers affected by the global crisis especially displaced overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 
This program includes: a) counseling and advisory programs to guide laid-off workers on 
their re-entry to productive employment; b) employment services to reconnect them with 
productive employment; and c) training, negotiation, and legal services that ensure workers 
recover unpaid salaries, benefits, and other monetary claims. POEA gave legal assistance and 
employment facilitation services. OWWA was responsible for repatriation services and 
TESDA for training and scholarships.  DOLE also actively participated in international 
dialogues to promote the welfare of overseas and migrant workers. 
 
6. Housing Programmes 
 
The government through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council 
(HUDCC) targeted to disburse PhP 85 billion loans to both institutional (developers and 
LGUs) and individual users.   Having a large multiplier effect throughout the economy, 
housing activities were expected to mitigate the impact of the Crisis. 
 
7. Multi-stakeholder Conferences and Consultations9 
 
The Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE) also spearheaded national and 
international consultations among tripartite and other social partners which led to the 
commitment of key stakeholders in saving and preserving jobs and in supporting business 
growth and workers’ safety nets: 
 
- Multi-sectoral Conference on the Global Financial Crisis: responding to the Employment 
Challenge, January 30, 2009, OSHC, Diliman, Quezon City 
- Multi-sectoral Summit on Business Growth and Employment, Safety Nets Group Pre-
Conference, February 5, 2009, Bayview Park Hotel, Manila 
- Multi-sectoral Job Summit: Joining Hands Against the Global Crisis, February 9, 2009, 
Malacanang Palace, Manila 
                                                 
9
 From the Planning Service of DOLE, “Government Safety Nets: Responding to Workers Affected by the Global 
Financial Crisis”, 16 November 2009 
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- Multi-sectroal Conference for GFC Affected Workers in Selected Agri-based Industries, 
February 13-14, Apo View Hotel, Davao City 
- Overseas Employment Jobs Forum, March 02, 2009, Malacanag, Manila 
- Employment and Business Opportunities: The Middle east Forum, April 12-13, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates 
 
The DOLE also sponsored various job fairs for displaced and unemployed workers. One of 
these was held during Labour Day, May 1, 2009. 
 
8. Export Support Fund(ESF) 
 
Since export-oriented companies were severely hit by the crisis, the ESF was established to 
provide some assistance to these firms. 70 % of the ESF was to be allocated to export 
development and promotion projects of small and medium enterprises, while the remaining 
30 % will be distributed among large-scale exporters, such as those from the business 
process outsourcing, information technology, and semiconductors and electronics 
manufacturing industries.  However, proposals need to be submitted and then approved by 
the Export Development Council. 
 
9. Local Government Assistance 
 
Most of the programmes discussed above were usually implemented in coordination with the 
local governments of affected areas as the latter were usually in the forefront of basic 
services delivered to their constituents.  Most of the LGUs also put up their own counterpart 
funds for the various programmes, e.g. CLEEP.  Some programmes and projects 
implemented by LGUs include job fairs, counselling and placements, livelihood and training 
programmes, trade fairs and cash assistance to vulnerable sectors. 
 
 
VI. Assessing the Government Responses 
 
A. Planning and Design Stage 
 
1. Timeliness 
 
The national government was already in a “crisis” mode when the Global Financial Crisis 
unfolded mainly because of the rapid increase in inflation in 2008 brought about by the 
increase in fuel (around June/July) and rice prices (around March/April). There were already 
anti-poverty programmes that were also being implemented to counter the effects of high 
inflation on vulnerable sectors e.g. Food for school Programme, Tindahan Natin Programme, 
Accelerated Hunger Mitigation Programme. 
 
In a certain sense, the national government was already primed for another set of crises 
starting with the financial crisis that would emanate from the United States particularly after 
the collapse of the financial giant, Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As could be seen in 
Annex A (Timeline of the Government Response), the government was relatively quick in 
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the formulation of a plan to cushion the negative effects of the crisis.  The national planning 
agency spearheaded the preparatory meetings which came up with concrete plans to respond 
to the crisis.   The preparatory meetings involved other key economic-related agencies like 
the Bankgo Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Budget 
and Management.  This group usually met as the Economic Managers Team or as the 
Development Budget Coordination Committee which discusses and resolves monetary and 
fiscal issues.  The official Economic Resiliency Plan emerged early in January 2009 although 
the budget strategy was already in place in December as the Executive branch expected the 
Legislative to approve the budget before the year ended.  However, the National Budget was 
only approved during the last week of January.  
 
Monetary authorities were the quickest to react as the BSP first reduced policy rates in 
December 2008.  Most of the fiscal stimulus packages had to wait before the budget was 
finally enacted.  Also, such spending usually incur some lags because of the bureaucratic 
processes of fund requests, allocations and releases. While the monetary environment 
preserved liquidity in the early stages, the fiscal stimulus lagged in implementation.  This 
would be seen basically in the GDP figures for the three quarters of the year where the Q1 
growth in 2009 was only .6%, while the next two quarters registered only .8%.  The 
implementation of ESF which was to help exporters hit by the crisis was much delayed with 
projects being approved only in November 2009. Unfortunately also, when the additional 
spending was already in place, two major disasters occurred which also affected similar areas 
hit by the financial crisis10. 
 
 
2. Institutional Mechanism for Coordination11 
 
The early responses were coordinated through several institutions, such as the Development 
Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) and the Economic Managers’ Meeting. The DBCC 
is composed of the Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Budget and Management 
(DBM), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (BSP), and the Office of the President (OP).  The Economic Managers’ Meeting 
includes the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BSP, Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), and Department of Energy (DOE). 
 
The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) served as the focal point in terms 
of gathering key reports and information on activities related to the national response and 
also on the developments at the global level.  The NEDA gives fortnightly updates to the 
President and the Cabinet which was coined as “GRIM” (Global Recession Impact Monitor) 
during the early months of the crisis which eventually became “GRIN” (Global Recession 
Impact News) when there appeared to be signs of recovery. Meanwhile, the Cabinet 
assistance System (CAS) which serves as Secretariat for the Cabinet would meet every week 
to monitor and follow up agreements made during the said meetings.  These include status of 
                                                 
10
 Typhoon “Ondoy” dumped a record amount of rainfall on Metro Manila and Southern Luzon in late 
September 2009, while typhoon “Pepeng” brought huge rains that triggered landslides and floods 
throughout northern Luzon about a week later. 
11
 Based on Director Dennis Arroyo’s response to the author’s questionnaire 
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programs and projects related to GRIM/GRIN reports.  At the grassroot levels, monitoring 
was done through implementing agencies and their satellites, which report to the CAS and in 
the Cabinet meetings through their heads.  The NEDA is a regular participant to the CAS 
meetings to anticipate and include in the NEDA reports and GRIN reports the latest 
presidential directives.  The National Statistics Coordination Board was tasked to monitor 
global trends while the Bureau of Labour and Employment Statistics of DOLE was tasked to 
monitor job displacements i.e. domestic and overseas workers and also those which were 
assisted by government agencies. 
 
There were also specific agencies who led the response for certain sectors.  For example, for 
the poorest and most vulnerable sectors, it was the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development (with their 4Ps as the flagship programme), the Department of Labour and 
Employment and attached agencies (with various programmes) for displaced formal sector 
and overseas workers and for the affected exporters, the Department of Trade and Industry.  
The National Anti-Poverty Commission was given the responsibility to monitor the 
developments for CLEEP.   A positive indicator of the coordination occurring among these 
agencies was the presence of updated reports on the status of interventions which can be 
accessed by the public including researchers.  The GRIN and GRIM reports are also 
accessible in the NEDA website.   
 
However, much better coordination could be done in terms of the implementation of social 
protection measures.  While there is already a Social Protection sub-committee under Social 
Development, coordination in the implantation of the varied programmes should further be 
strengthened.  A common definition and framework have been adopted by the key agencies 
but hopefully there will be consensus in the targeting and monitoring system.12 
 
 3. Targeting 
 
Early on, the government was already sure that export firms and their workers, overseas 
workers in hardly hit countries and already poor households will be most likely hit by the 
crisis.  However, which specific firms in case of exporters or what specific countries in the 
case of OFWs will be greatly affected was the major preoccupation of government agencies.  
The DOLE and POEA in late 2008 were keenly gathering information form their attaches to 
be able to anticipate displacements.  DOLE also kept watch in key export zones and sent key 
personnel to deal with brewing labour issues13.  However, there seem to have been no 
mechanism in ascertaining the specific sub sectors that were experiencing decline in 
production due to weakening global demand.  For the poor households, the government 
relied on the targeting system of the 4Ps.  However, the NHTS-PR was still being 
implemented during the crisis months. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The DSWD has its NHTS-PR while the DILG and NEDA mandated CBMS for local governments. 
13
 One interviewee even said that the President wanted lists of specific names of workers affected in the Export 
Zones. 
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B.  Implementation Stage 
 
1. Budget/Financial allocation for the response 
The government has committed to a P330 billion ($6.3 billion) stimulus package called the 
Philippine Economy Resiliency Plan, which includes the following: 
 P160 billion to fund small, community-level infrastructure;  
 P40 billion tax relief arising from an increase in personal exemptions (P20 billion) and 
the scheduled reduction in corporate tax rates (P20 billion) as provided in the 
Restructured Value Added Tax law; 
 P100 billion for large infrastructure from government financial institutions and private 
commercial banks; and 
 P30 billion from social security institutions in the form of additional benefits to members; 
this will be taken from the gap between contributions and claims. 
Indonesia and the Philippines have each earmarked about $6.3 billion for such a package. 
The Philippine allocation was equivalent to 4.0% of its 2008 GDP, while that of Indonesia 
was only 1.4%.  
An effective stimulus package would need greater resources beyond the planned government 
budget. One view was that of the P330 billion (US $6.92 billion based on current exchange 
rate of USD 1 = PhP47.672) allocated for the ERP, only P50 billion ($1.85 billion) can be 
considered as new funds (Pineda, 2009). According to this view, the said amount represents 
the sum realigned from the P252 billion allotted for servicing debt interest payments in the 
P1.41-trillion ($ 29.58 billion) national budget for 2009. However, other critics of the Plan 
assert that most of the stimulus funds were only realigned budgets and there was only 
between 7 billion – 70 billion in new money for the programmes.14 The P100 billion private-
public partnership for large infrastructure never took off and there was really no cash outlay 
for the tax relief of P40 billion. The World Bank however, in its November 2009 East Asia 
Report said that many countries including the Philippines spent more than the programmed 
fiscal stimulus packages.  It cannot be denied though that the government embarked on many 
large scale infrastructure projects during the crisis months. 
 
2.  Policy Coherence  
 
The national government was very much aware of the need to have coherent policies and 
strategies to maximize the positive impact of their response to the crisis.  However, as 
policies have varied objectives, they are not always aligned with each other.  For example, 
stimulus spending through the various social protection and emergency employment 
programmes may worsen the fiscal situation of the country.  While the former hopes to give 
some breathing space for affected sectors it may cause a medium and long run negative 
impact on the economy as the credit standing of the country deteriorates because of the 
                                                 
14
 The 7 billion figure came from Governor Jose Salceda, the Presidential Economic Adviser, the 70 billion came from 
Dr. Benjamin Diokno, former Budget Secretary while former National Treasurer Leonor Briones said it was only 10 
billion. 
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growing fiscal deficit.  Such was the dilemma of the Economic Managers Team when it was 
discussing the Economic Resiliency Plan.  The monetary authorities were ready to loosen 
liquidity but the fiscal authorities were bent on showing fiscal discipline. This was probably 
the reason why the actual amounts for the fiscal stimulus were criticized as being relatively 
small.   A major bottleneck for a strong economic stimulus package is really this lack of 
fiscal capacity and revenue collection to come up with sufficient funds to spend. If the 
government goes for higher fiscal deficits, the credit rating agencies and multilateral 
institutions may penalize it by downgrading Philippine credit worthiness which may result 
into loss of confidence and cause massive capital flight and currency depreciation.  An 
Ateneo colleague Joseph Y. Lim notes:  
 
“The Philippines must therefore be astute in tackling this problem.  One reason why many countries are 
facing a fiscal problem in trying to stimulate the economy is because mainstream economics continue to 
hold on to the false claim of monetarism that too much money will cause inflation.  In a period of very high 
excess capacity, low commodity prices and deflation, this just is a fictitious danger.  There is much room 
for the Philippines and many other developing countries to monetize the deficit. This will avoid increasing 
the public and external debt burden and at the same time will not cause inflation.  Thus the Philippines 
should allow the BSP to buy treasury bills in order to finance the deficit spending of the government.”  
 
Other attempts at policy coherence were the initiatives undertaken in the social protection 
sector.  The National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) of the 
DSWD hopes to centralize household information on poor and vulnerable households 
accessible to other social protection programmes like Philhealth.  Before this the NAPC, 
NEDA and the DILG had mandated among LGUs the Community Based Monitoring System 
as the vehicle for collecting information on poor and vulnerable households.  The DSWD 
meanwhile explains that the CBMs should be complementary to the NHTS-PR.   The success 
of the 4Ps will also require policy coordination and coherence among key agencies like the 
DSWD, DOH and DEPED as the conditionalities for the cash grant require adequate 
education and health facilities in targeted areas.  Another positive step towards policy 
coherence in the social protection sectors is the adoption of a common framework as well as 
the creation of the National Social Protection and Welfare Program Cluster through 
Administrative Order no. 232 which aims to rationalize, group and strengthen existing 
programs and services of government agencies dealing with social welfare and protection.  
This cluster also commissioned the Development Academy of the Philippines to do a study 
entitled “Review and Strengthening of the National Social Protection and Welfare Program” 
in February 2009.  This is a good start but a lot has still to be done to rationalize and expand 
social protection especially for the poorest and vulnerable sectors. 
 
3. Relevance and Impact 
 
The caveat in assessing the impact of the government response is that there were other 
compounding or mitigating factors accompanying the global financial crisis.  For example, 
even before the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the country had already 
experienced price volatility due to the rapid increases in rice and fuel prices.  Also, after the 
global economy was showing early signs of recovery in September 2009, two disastrous 
typhoons hit the country.   It must also be mentioned that the unexpected resilience of 
remittances from overseas workers also tended to cushion the impact of the Crisis. 
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a. Economic growth 
 
The fiscal stimulus-cum-accommodative monetary policy was able to prevent the 
economy from falling into a recession.  While GDP growth in Q1 of this year fell 
markedly to .6% (revised figure), the next two quarters saw a slight increase in growth to 
.8%. It is now expected that the full year GDP growth rate will fall in the lower end of the 
government’s target of .8-1.8%.  Son and San Andres (2009) comparing the country with 
Thailand and Korea notes that the Crisis’ impact on growth in the Philippines was rather 
small, although it has become significant since the first quarter of 2009. They add that 
economic growth in the Philippines has held up relatively well because it is not highly 
integrated with global financial markets and the broader global economy and remittances 
from overseas workers did not fall sharply as initially expected.  The continued increase 
in overseas workers’ remittances is seen at 4% for the full year.  This defies expectations 
which saw the IMF and the World Bank predicting negative growth.  In part, 
government’s interventions for redeployment and seeking new markets compensated for 
the lost income of displaced overseas workers. As mentioned above, growth could have 
been higher if not for the negative impact of two devastating disasters, typhoons Ondoy 
and Pepeng which surely dampened economic activity in this last quarter.   
 
b. Employment and Quality of Jobs Generated 
 
The government’s various programmes for emergency employment (CLEEP, etc.) were 
able to generate 375,000 jobs as of October 2009.  However, as these are mostly short-
term low income jobs, better jobs should be available as soon as the recovery comes into 
in full swing.  It is surprising though that in July 2009, the percentage of wage workers 
increased to 55.3% from 51% in April 2009, clear signs of a possible recovery in the 
offing. 
 
c. Prices 
 
From a peak of 12.4% in August 2008, headline inflation began a general downtrend until 
it reached 0.1% in August this year, the lowest in 22 years15.  Lower inflation for food 
(particularly for rice, meat and miscellaneous food items) and base effects from 
extremely high fuel and food prices accounted for the sustained decline in inflation rates.  
With diminishing base effects, inflation began to rise 0.7% in September, 1.6% in 
October and 2.6% in November. 
 
d. Credit 
 
Bank lending continued to post an increase in 2009 as the liquidity enhancing measures 
earlier undertaken by the BSP supported credit activity in the system.  Outstanding loans 
of commercial banks including reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs) grew by 6.1% year 
on year to reach P2.2 trillion in September 2009, an acceleration from a previous month’s 
growth of 3.1%.  Although YOY, bank lending growth slowed down to single digit levels 
                                                 
15
 This is also because of the so called “base effect” since inflation rates were very high a year before.  Inflation rates 
are quoted year on year (YOY). 
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beginning July, credit growth remained positive and continued to be directed towards the 
productive sectors of the economy. 
 
Banks’ non-performing loans ratio remained at single digit levels.  As end of September 
2009, NPL ratio for universal and commercial banks eased to 3.25% from the previous 
month’s 3.5% and from last year’s 4.03%.  This is the lowest from a peak of 18.81% at 
end October 2001. 
 
e. Social protection and targeted vulnerable sectors 
 
The major social protection programme of the country, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Programme implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
(DSWD) have two sets of beneficiaries identified in 2008 and 2009.  For the former, the 
4Ps was implemented in 28 provinces covering 148 municipalities and 12 key cities.  
375,829 household beneficiaries received cash grants amounting to P 2,668,917,000.00 
while 21,615 pregnant women and 381,789 children age 0-5 years received health grants. 
For the latter, 4Ps was implemented in 28 provinces covering 107 municipalities and 3 
key cities.  324,171 households received cash grants amounting to P472,348,900.0016. 
For the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (as of September, 
2009), 489,870 households were identified as poor. 
 
Many of the social protection programs are hindered by low coverage and inadequate 
benefits, poor targeting, and operational constraints due to lack of coordination among 
program implementers. Low coverage incurred through the years and overreliance on 
foreign grants meant lower government spending on social services and a higher risk of 
program discontinuation. Lack of funding support is exacerbated by poor targeting, 
causing leakages and wastage of resources on the non-poor and the near-poor (Manasan 
2009, Aldaba, 2008) 
 
Furthermore, social protection programs are in most cases implemented on a piece-meal 
basis, due to differing mandates of program implementers. As a result, overlaps and 
redundancies in sectoral and geographical beneficiaries abound, causing additional strain 
on scarce resources (Manasan 2009).  For example the objectives and the intended 
beneficiaries of the Food-for School Program and the 4Ps overlap. These two programs 
have very similar objectives and run in the same geographical areas. Manasan’s study 
emphasizes that “the capacity of the transient poor and the near poor, many of whom 
belong to the informal sector, to cope with the income risk arising from loss of 
employment or reduction in earnings that are typically associated with a macro-economic 
crisis is limited.” At present, at least 33% of the total number of poor households are not 
covered under the Sponsored Program. Moreover, there are indications that some of the 
so-called poor households who are currently enrolled in the program are not poor, 
bringing the undercoverage rate up to 50% or more (Yap, Reyes and Cuenca, 2009) 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 As of July 2009 
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4. National - Local Coordination 
 
Most of the programmes implemented on the ground were done through the local 
government units. What happened was that each national agency was given a responsibility 
to assist specific local governments in implementing programmes in the response17.  The 
local governments also raised their counterpart resources for these programmes given the 
limited funds allotted to them.  However, the official channel for local government 
supervision is through the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).  The 
package of interventions to assist select LGUs mitigate the impact of the crisis to local 
economies is called the Local Economic Assistance Programme (LEAP)18.  The programme 
shall provide assistance to these LGUs in steering local economic activities and creating 
opportunities supportive of employment generation and economic growth.  The programme 
covers immediate measures and the institutionalization of medium and long term economic 
foundation.    
 
The sustained growth and development of local economies will be the best insurance for 
them to be able to survive the next crisis.  This will also strengthen their capacity to develop 
effective mechanisms to respond to any crisis whether economic or disaster related19. 
Esguerra (2009) describes various initiatives at the local levels to mitigate and cushion the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis.  For example, in Agusan del Sur, the  Sub-contracting 
Partners Innovation Programme (SPIN) matches large exporters with small suppliers and 
subcontractors.  The DTI assists the latter (usually micro, small and medium enterprises) in 
terms of capacity building and trainings to teach skills and or improve the quality of their 
products. A similar example is in Davao de Norte where rice and banana farmers are 
collectively organized into “corporatives” and enter into long-term fixed contracts with 
multinational corporations. This in turn enables them to access collateral free long term 
financing.  
 
C. Mechanisms for Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
 1.  M&E Mechanism 
  
It could be assumed that the mechanisms for coordination (i.e. DBCC, Economic Managers’ 
team and NEDA) will also be utilized for monitoring and evaluation of the response.  
However, it would seem that the specific tasks of monitoring were delegated to specific 
agencies concerned with the programme responses e.g. DSWD for 4Ps or the DOLE for 
assistance to OFWs. There was no clear oversight inter-agency group responsible for 
monitoring and evaluating the key programmes.  In employment generation, particularly the 
CLEEP, it was the National Anti-Poverty Commission which was in charge of monitoring 
the various agencies involved in the implementation of the programme. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 This was confirmed by most of the interviewees.  Their Secretaries were given specific assignments.  
18
 This was supplied by Director Dennis Arroyo of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 
19
 This was the same opinion by Undersecretary Austere Panadero of the Department of the Interior and Local 
Government 
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1. Pulse from the Households20 
 
- The skills training programs of TESDA under DOLE and micro-finance and 
livelihood programs of DSWD i.e. SEA-K seems to be successful in generating 
support for laid-off employees and households.  It would be beneficial to have these 
programs made more accessible and replicated particularly in areas affected by the 
Economic Crisis.   
 
- At the same time, it seems that only a few have availed of support programs and 
assistance from the government in the sectors analyzed.  It is possible that many are 
not aware of these programs, particularly among the informal service support 
providers in the cities.  It also seems that most information comes from being a 
member of organized groups, being active in the community or having a social 
network.  The local government units particularly barangay communities can be 
pivotal in being able to share information and in increasing awareness of available 
support and assistance. 
 
- Financial literacy and management skills among employees, small businessmen and 
their households seems to be an important cushion to address unexpected changes in a 
household’s economic situation.  Savings and other investments proved to be an edge 
among some retrenched employees and some small businesses that were better able to 
adjust to the Crisis.    
 
- In the FGDs, household meal expenses were greatly assisted by the availability of the 
“NFA rice” or the subsidized rice sold at much lower prices by the government’s 
National Food Authority (NFA) under the Department of Agriculture (DA).  
Continuous availability for the duration of the economic crisis was requested for this 
subsidy. 
 
- While the DOLE seems to be the more visible agency tasked to address the loss of 
employment and corresponding changes in lifestyle among laid-off employees, it 
seems that most of their resources and assistance are availed of by OFWs and their 
dependents.  As gathered in the study, the existing programs of DSWD and DA seem 
to have been beneficial to the households and dependents of the employees. It is 
obvious that there are more government agencies which can provide assistance, i.e. 
DTI for small businesses affected by the Global Crisis. 
 
- There is a need to coordinate and possibly institutionalize action plans across national 
and local government agencies.  DSWD for instance, seems to be a key agency in 
organizing community-based programs.  Related to this, DSWD seems to be in a 
position to address the socio-psychological effects of the global economic crisis on 
affected households. 
 
- The participants from various FGDs had several specific recommendations like: 
 
                                                 
20
 From Lopez ( 2009) and PIMA (2009) 
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o revising the age limit for employment in Philippine manufacturing or service 
companies (e.g., 18-50 years old) so that displaced employees can still get another 
employment,  
o government ensuring that displaced employees from abroad will have a Job 
Continuation Program by automatically assisting and actively searching for 
employment opportunities for displaced OFWs,  
o removing age limits for training programs such s those for TESDA 
o removing “Contractual” arrangements so that Filipino workers are given job 
assurance and security of tenure,  
o employ direct hiring and remove the use of “agency arrangement”,  
o studying the possibility of having pension plans for OFWs and  
o removing placement fees for ease in applying abroad to work 
o more access to credit for microentrepreneurs  
 
D. Some Important Lessons Learned 
 
1.  On the Timeliness of the Response 
 
The positive impact of the response could have been maximized if the fiscal stimulus was 
implemented earlier in consonance with the monetary responses.  These could have 
happened if the government already had the budget for the additional spending.  To 
remedy this, government needs to have an emergency budget allocation process. Better 
still, it should have some adequate contingency funds when confronted by a major crises 
which can easily be mobilized without congressional approval but with necessary 
safeguards for transparency and accountability.  In line with this, bidding and contract 
processes must also be devised to hasten approvals for quick disbursements.  However, 
adequate safeguards ensure transparency in the requisition and disbursement process and 
accountability in the reportorial and audit process should also be in place. 
 
2.   On the Components of the Response 
 
The government must have in place a group of experts and technical people who will be 
able to identify the likely sectors and areas to be hit by the crisis.  This group must be 
able to access the most recent economic data and statistics from the global and national 
economies. This could probably be led or lodged in the national economic planning 
agency (e.g. NEDA) or the primary economic think tank (i.e. PIDS).  The former actually 
played this role in the government’s response. This group will also be responsible in 
tracking whether the affected sectors were actually reached by the programme responses 
and could possible recommend how to plug leakages in programmes.  This group can 
have a multi-stakeholder composition that may include representatives from the private 
sector and NGO think tanks.  
 
From the experience, the response could have been quicker if the government has a ready 
database of poor households at the national and local levels to facilitate targeting. The 
government has started implementing this but it should further be refined to align existing 
systems i.e. CBMS alongside with the national targeting system.  Related to this is the 
 52
establishment of a comprehensive social protection which will include the informal sector 
and the very poor.  Unemployment insurance for the formal sector can now be mulled 
while emergency employment programmes must be attuned towards future productivity 
e.g. relevant infrastructure. 
 
With some signs for a recovery in the economy, an exit strategy might soon be needed 
soon that will again align monetary and fiscal policy.  However, what will be important is 
the continuation of key governance and economic reforms that will gear the economy 
towards full recovery and higher levels of sustained growth (see recommendations 
below). 
 
3.   On the Funding of the Response  
 
Aside from a permanent budget line as proposed above, government must be able to 
mobilize resources from other sectors – donors, NGOs and the private sector.  This will 
require a government to be transparent and accountable in allocating resources raised 
from these sectors of society. Mobilizing resources from other sectors will minimize the 
risk of government in incurring very wide budget deficits. But revenue capacity is 
important to be able to improve collection efficiency.   As the economy is weak and thus 
the potential revenues also decreased, this could be mitigated if the collection efficiency 
will be greatly improved.  In addition, the absorptive capacity of implementing agencies 
must also be increased while at the same time minimizing leakages and corruption in the 
expenditures. 
 
A permanent budget line may be one solution for an immediate availability of resources 
for an emergency response.  But this budget must be lodged with an agency responsible 
for the response.  This could be under the NEDA or DSWD or another agency that will 
be the lead in implementing the response.  This is important so that emergency resources 
shall already have been allocated way ahead of the occurrence of the crisis or disaster 
such that the magnitude of fiscal deficits can actually be foreseen so that the government 
can have a manageable debt strategy. 
 
4.  On the Institutional Mechanisms for Coordination and Coherence 
 
In a certain sense, this is in place already i.e., NEDA, DBCC.  It is actually the NEDA 
which is the lead agency in coordinating the response although a multi-agency group, the 
DBCC or the Economic Managers team act as some sort of an executive committee to the 
Cabinet which makes the key policy decisions on the response.  Improvements can still 
be made wherein key implementing agencies like the DSWD and the DOLE would be 
members of these mechanisms. 
 
5.  On National and Local Coordination 
 
In the actual response, the national agencies still took the lead. LGUs acted as 
implementing partners and recipients of assistance.  Some LGUs were even asked to raise 
counterpart funding for the response.  Since some are resource constrained, they had to 
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rely on national agencies alone for the response.  However, in the long run capacities of 
LGUs to respond to various crises must be strengthened.  For example, their ability to 
mobilize local resources in particular, remittances as suggested by Esguerra (2009) and to 
access donor funding must be further enhanced.  Of course, strengthening their ability to 
promote local economic development will help them become less vulnerable to crises and 
disasters. 
 
6.  On Monitoring and Feedback Mechanisms 
 
While there are mechanisms to consult organized groups like trade unions or NGOs, it 
would still be relevant if government is able to get immediate feedback from affected 
households.  This could be incorporated in the national targeting mechanism so that 
current government responses may be tweaked or nuanced for greater positive impact on 
households.  An M&E mechanism must be built as a sub-committee in the institutional 
coordination mechanism i.e. the DBCC or the Economic Managers Team. 
 
7.  On the Over-all Strategy  
 
The crisis has exposed further the vulnerabilities and structural issues of the Philippine 
economy – dependence on a few export products and remittances, being consumption 
driven amidst declining investments and increasing poverty despite moderate growth. 
The country then has a real chance to deal with both the short-term issues brought about 
by the 2008 crisis and such unresolved structural problems. The current crisis can thus be 
turned into an opportunity to undertake more fundamental reforms in the economy.  
Chapter VIII will further discuss these possibilities. 
 
 
 
VII.  Responses from Other Major Stakeholders 
 
A. Private Sector 
 
The private sector responded to the Crisis at various levels.  At the firm level, companies tried to 
delay retrenchments and lay-offs by reducing workdays or by time-sharing among the workforce 
or other types of flexible workweek schedules.  They have also been proposing to government 
practical approaches to reducing business costs through temporary suspension of benefits or the 
relaxation of rules on tenure and deployment.  When lay-offs are inevitable; some companies 
such as Intel gave assistance for job search and even gave resources for its workers to be able to 
find alternative jobs or livelihood activities. In addition some companies involved their workers 
in transition programs like training and re-training programs offered by government agencies like 
TESDA and NGOs like Go-Negosyo.  Some also helped in finding jobs for displaced overseas 
workers. At the macro level, the private sector pledged counterpart resources for infrastructure of 
around P 100 billion. They have also identified with government key growth sectors which the 
country could focus on while on the way to economic recovery. 
 
B. NGOs and MFIs 
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NGOs meanwhile have organized various forums to present their own analyses of the Crisis and  
its impact on the economy.  They have also given critiques of the government response in these 
various forums and articulated the needs and interests of sectors who were greatly affected by the 
Crisis.21  They usually emphasize the need for government to deliver immediate economic relief 
measures and advocate their regular menu of proposals which include the following: removal of 
the regressive RVAT on oil products, implementation of a nationwide across-the-board wage 
hike, increase the budget for social services, and suspension debt payments.  
Specific to the crisis, the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) and the National Urban Poor 
Coalition (NUPCO) have urged lawmakers to push for the implementation of existing laws and 
orders mandating the adoption of labour-based, equipment supported (LBES) methods in 
infrastructure programs to be funded by the stimulus package. The current economic stimulus 
program will be more effective if it creates more jobs for the unemployed and the 
underemployed through LBES projects. This is an approach supported by the ILO as it 
dramatically increases the number of workers employed in infrastructure programs.  Under this 
approach, the cost-share of labor can rise up to an average of 30%. Traditional methods are more 
intensive on the use of capital and equipment, and labor very seldom makes up more than 10% of 
the project cost. The idea is to replace machines with labor power, especially in earth moving 
and small infrastructure tasks, but without sacrificing quality and without introducing undue 
delays in project implementation. “We believe it can become the major mode for the 
participation of local government units in national programs for responding to the economic 
crisis,” according to Jude Esguerra, Executive  Director of IPD.  
NGOs also highlight the need for genuine social protection which goes beyond the concept of 
social security and insurance programs. According to a joint statement of various civil society 
groups22 social protection is about “claiming the most vulnerable people’s basic right to food, 
shelter, water, health, jobs, and other essential services….these are not only the people who have 
lost homes and jobs as a result of the crisis, but also the millions of families in developing 
countries that have long been living in crisis conditions, neglected by their governments and 
denied their basic rights and access to services and resources”. They also called on developed 
country donors to increase their ODA commitment to 0.7% of gross national income. 
 
NGOs and other microfinance institutions meanwhile have expanded their credit services to 
displaced workers here and from abroad. The leading microfinance institution in the Philippines, 
CARD Bank, noted that amid the global financial turmoil, there was a significant rise in the 
number of its microfinance borrowers, which more than doubled from 50,990 in 2007 to 121,752 
in 2008 (Llanto and Badiola, 2009). 
 
C. Trade Unions 
Trade unions meanwhile have increased their advocacy for Decent Work as the proper response 
to the ongoing Global Financial Crisis. They have also called attention to the following labour 
                                                 
21
 Examples of NGOs who give critiques of the response include Ibon Foundation, Freedom from Debt Coalition and 
the Institute for Popular Democracy, Global Call to Action against Poverty, CODE-NGO, etc. 
22
 “Civil Society Statement on the ASEM Development Conference: Towards Sustainable Development” April 23, 
2009 
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market issues related to the crisis: worsened child labour situation, increased vulnerabilities of 
overseas workers, union busting incidents, the need for unemployment insurance, low 
unionization of the BPO industry and increased poverty among the working class.  Through the 
World Day of Decent Work (WDDW) Campaign various unions highlighted the Call to Action’s 
eight key demands: protection of fundamental labor rights; changing unfair trade rules and 
reforming the World Bank and the IMF; improving the situation of women and men working in 
the informal economy; providing social protection to the majority of the world’s population who 
live without it; increasing development assistance; and ratifying and implementing the UN and 
ILO conventions around the protection of migrant workers and their families23.  In addition, they 
noted that the key to rebalancing growth is Decent Work through full and productive 
employment, respect for workers’ rights, broadened social protection, reduction of exploitation 
of migrant workers and changes in unfair trade rules.   
Other unions like the Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL) want to put in place a strategic and 
coherent national framework of development, not only to respond to the crises, but to ensure an 
economic thrust that will revive the local economy, invigorate the domestic market, and create 
jobs and livelihoods in the country, in accordance with the principles of equity, sustainability and 
justice. They also warned that the stimulus packages may again be subject to leakages and 
corruption as what happened to several projects and programs in the past.24 The APL also scored 
the suggestion of the private sector on a flexible work week and asserted that workers should not 
single-handedly bear the brunt of dealing with the Crisis by “blackmailing” them to accept 
“voluntarily” flexible work arrangements lest they swiftly become jobless and penniless. They 
also note that the crisis itself is a crisis of capitalism and that government must generate jobs, and 
not to use the illusion of creating jobs through jobs fairs.  Some unions though like FFW and 
TUCP have implemented programs that directly assist displaced workers through training/re-
training (in coordination with TESDA) and job placements. 
VIII.  Recommendations for Coherent Policy Response and Addressing 
Decent Work Deficits 
 
While the government tried to do its best in responding to the Crisis despite its various 
constraints, the country remains vulnerable to many types of risks given the structural problems 
inherent in the macroeoconomy.  In addition, the government response has also exposed the 
areas where it needs to improve in tackling various types of crises and in addressing Decent 
Work deficits.  In particular, providing the population with sustainable quality jobs remain the 
most pressing concern of the government.  A second priority is the further development and 
improvement of a feasible social protection system to lift an increasing number of  Filipinos out 
of chronic poverty.  But underlying both of this is the provision of an adequate political and 
economic environment for sustainable growth to occur in the next few years. 
 
A.  
B.  
C.  
                                                 
23
 Philippine ITUC-AP affiliates, the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) and Federation of Free Workers 
(FFW) 
24
 The fertilizer scam and the NBN-ZTE deals 
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D. The Economy Remains Vulnerable 
 
The Philippines is still highly vulnerable despite its positive growth rate this year.  As was 
discussed in the introduction, the Philippines has suffered from boom and bust cycles where the 
latter have always been associated with economic or political crises and natural or man made 
disasters. Currently, the areas of vulnerability include: 
 
1. Fiscal risks related to the growing budget deficit.  This year, the fiscal gap reached P 298 
billion or roughly about 4% of GDP.  With still a moderately low growth expected this 
year, the tax take may not be enough to get the country out of this trend of increasing 
deficits.  In addition government is bent on continuing the implementation of the fiscal 
stimulus as advised by multilateral and bilateral institutions.  With a fresh administration 
next year, new reform measures to increase revenues may still have to wait e.g. sin taxes, 
Simplified Net Income Tax System (SNIT) and redundant fiscal incentives.  Aside from 
the fiscal stimulus, there will be salary increases for most government employee which 
will be a big bulk of expenditure in the coming years.  This will also affect the delivery of 
services at the community levels as the IRA of local governments may drastically 
decrease as weak collection in the past three years will be the basis for next year’s 
allocation. 
 
2. Political Risks: With the Maguindanao massacre, political uncertainty has been 
heightened especially after the declaration of a localized Martial Law.  Even with a 
scheduled presidential elections in May, talks abound about the possibility of either 
elections not being held (because of the presence of private armies) or having election 
failure (as the Commission on Elections, COMELEC may be unprepared for the 
automated elections).  This uncertainty coupled with a yawning fiscal deficit may further 
weaken investor confidence which has deteriorated in the last years of the Arroyo regime.   
Political uncertainty coupled with increased economic difficulties in the lower strata of 
society may also result in increased peace-and-order problems. 
 
3. Macroeconomic Risks: While some green shoots may already be seen today, recovery in 
developed economies may still be slow and this may dampen demand for Filipino 
workers abroad and for exports from the country.  FDI may still be low as investors 
remain cautious. The Dubai crisis that unravelled in November 2009 may have a negative 
impact on the employment of Filipinos and also on the remittances they are sending.   A 
slow growth in remittances may greatly affect GDP growth since at its peak, they 
consisted almost 12% of GDP. 
 
4. Disaster risks: since the Philippines is in the Rim of Fire, it is inevitable that natural 
disasters may strike the country. The “Ondoy” and “Pepeng” experience has actually 
exacerbated the negative effect of the Global Economic crisis.  Typhoons and 
earthquakes, depending on their strengths and magnitude, may destroy infrastructure, 
property and decrease economic activities. 
 
5. Conflict Risks: the two ongoing rebellions i.e. of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 
Mindanao and the Communist Party of the Philippines-National Democratic Front in 
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various parts of the country remain unresolved.  The combined armed strength of the two 
forces is still enough to affect economic activity in selected areas of the country. 
 
E. Key Recommendations25 
 
The best example of policy incoherence is probably growth that does not reduce employment 
or poverty.  Inclusive growth means growth where the citizenry participates in creating that 
growth and benefiting from it.   This means a growth that increases employment and reduces 
poverty.   Crafting such a strategy would require a thorough analysis of the structural roots of 
Philippine underdevelopment (including governance failure and institutional weaknesses) 
and an openness towards alternative development strategies.  In a crisis period, it is very 
difficult to make strategies and programmes coherent.  For instance, emergency employment 
cannot create high quality jobs as these are aimed primarily for consumption smoothing or 
poverty alleviation.  In fact, the design of such jobs is to pay workers below market rates so 
that self selection occurs in favour of those who are unemployed and targeted by the 
programme.   Thus, in times of recovery and growth periods, the flexibility of government to 
adopt more coherent strategies become wider.  With more revenues and with the private 
sector enjoying high profitability, government can readily formulate social protection and 
poverty alleviation programmes to be able to increase the capacity of marginalized sectors to 
participate in the process of wealth creation. But how then can we generate more quality jobs 
for our people in the local economy and address decent work deficits in this phase of a 
fledgling and fragile recovery? 
 
A. Understanding the Critical Constraints to Sustained Economic Growth 
The demand for labour is a derived demand i.e. it follows from increased demand for goods 
and services from outside or inside the country.  Thus, any type of constraint that decreases 
the growth potential of the country is also a hurdle for job creation. Most of the reasons 
outlined below are related to critical constraints to growth of the Philippine economy.  The 
ADB (2007) study on Philippine Critical Development Constraints uses a variety of evidence 
to determine the critical constraints to growth in the Philippines, among which are: a tight 
fiscal situation, inadequate infrastructure, weak investor confidence (mainly due to 
governance and institutions failure) and an inefficient labour market.  All these constraints 
were eventually accentuated during the GFC.  
Many of these critical constraints are interlinked. Only when the fiscal situation sufficiently 
improves will the Government be in a position to allocate more resources to infrastructure 
investment. However, improved infrastructure alone is not enough to lower the cost of doing 
business and to stimulate private investment. Better infrastructure has to be accompanied by 
significant improvements in investor confidence, which can be done through the Government 
adequately addressing governance concerns by implementing initiatives aimed at reducing 
corruption and improving political stability.  
 
                                                 
25
 This section borrows heavily from Aldaba (2009) 
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Removing these three constraints (e.g., tight fiscal space, inadequate infrastructure, and weak 
investor confidence) will result in increased private investments from domestic and foreign 
sources. But, to ensure that growth can be sustained at a high level similar to that achieved by 
many Southeast and East Asian economies in recent decades, the Government will also need 
to address the market failures (such as information and coordination externalities) in order to 
encourage investments for diversifying and expanding the manufacturing sector/exports, and 
in upgrading the level of technology.  Sustained high growth, resulting from removing the 
critical constraints, will create more productive employment opportunities. This is essential 
because insufficient and low quality employment is the most critical constraint to poverty 
reduction in the Philippines.  
 
B.  Specific Recommendations: 
 
1. Governance and institutional reforms: a new government hopefully takes over and 
improve governance in the country by June 2010 and at the very least minimize corruption at 
the high echelons of government.  Peace negotiations with rebel groups must be continued 
towards full political settlement and lasting peace. 
 
2.  Continuing fiscal reforms: In the immediate run, there must be increased tax effort 
through changes in the sin taxes, implementation of the Simplified Net Income Tax System 
(SNIT), abolition of redundant fiscal incentives and increased excise taxes on other luxury 
goods and on gasoline products.  In the long run, reforming the revenue collecting agencies 
for better tax collection ill be a must. 
 
3. Attracting both foreign and local investors in the economy by solving key investment 
constraints particularly the high cost of doing business in the country.  Essentially, these 
include reducing bureaucratic red tape and corruption in the bureaucracy, improving 
infrastructure services (seaports, airports, energy, etc.) and ensuring security among 
investors. 
 
4. Crafting and implementing a sound industrial policy for job creation 
 
These should be founded on a strategic collaboration between the government and the private 
sector with the aim of identifying where the constraints and obstacles for industrial 
restructuring lie and what type of interventions most likely will remove them.  These would 
entail: 
 
- Providing venues of collaboration and support for sunrise and potential industries 
where the country is competitive and has comparative advantage especially for highly 
labor intensive sectors or for those that create multiple linkages (backward and 
forward) in the economy; this collaboration should bring about more growth drivers 
for the economy so that it can be weaned from its dependence on semi-conductor 
exports and remittances 
- Strategic Assessment of sunrise and potential industries and sectors – examining their 
strengths and weakness and looking at how government will be able to assist in 
improving the global competitiveness of such sectors in terms of basic infrastructure 
 59
support to industrial clusters, market information, linkage and networking, research & 
development and favorable policy environment. 
 
The lesson of the global near-depression is that industrial policy also requires a good balance 
between domestic demand and external demand.  A new development strategy should boost 
investments and create a strong domestic demand and production sector.  A strong domestic 
demand can only be created if problems of inequity are addressed and if benefits of economic 
growth are distributed broadly among the population. A strong domestic sector with strong 
domestic demand has been the one shielding China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam from 
entering a recession in the current turmoil (Lim 2009). 
 
5. Helping small and medium enterprises to flourish (as they are the main generators of jobs 
in the country) 
 
In the country, the lack of access to financing has severely constrained the growth of SMEs 
as private banks are reluctant to lend to SMEs because of their general aversion to dealing 
with a large number of small accounts. Many SMEs cannot access available funds due to 
their limited track record, limited acceptable collateral, and inadequate financial statements 
and business plans. Thus any serious job creation strategy must include: 
 
- Access to credit and finance - Some private banks were able to overcome these 
challenges by providing assistance in preparing accounting records, business advice, 
and simplifying loan documentation and tailor fitting loans to match the borrower’s 
cash flow 
- Institutions to monitor and diffuse new technologies and provide technological 
services e.g. material testing, inspection, certification of quality, instrument 
calibration, establishment of repositories of technical information, patent registration, 
research and design, and technical training 
- Programs for the provision of information exchange to local firms to make strategic 
linkages with multinational corporations (MNCs) – like the Singapore model 
 
6. Assisting local governments to create an adequate environment to attract and sustain 
investments especially labor intensive ones.  Local governments have been focused more on 
their regulatory function in terms of private sector investments.  Their paradigm must be 
shifted towards the promotion of local economic development and investments in their 
areas26. 
 
7. Development of financial markets to tap domestic savings and harness remittances into 
productive investments especially in local rural economies (to provide both in farm and off 
farm employment): 
 
- Creation of a variety of financial instruments that would attract savings from the 
middle and upper classes including remittances from OFWs which could then be 
channeled to various private sector initiatives especially in the rural areas. 
                                                 
26
 This is also the view of Undersecretary Austere Panadero of DILG 
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- Enhancement of the equity markets and open access to such by capable and efficient 
SMEs 
 
8. Improving the capability of our workforce 
 
- Continue implementing substantial reforms in all stages of the education and training 
system27 
- Skills upgrading and training for out of school youth and those who drop out of 
school 
- Strengthening of vocational and technical training especially for in-demand jobs and 
occupation 
- Solving labor market information and mismatch problems (through more efficient 
information) and labor mismatch issues (through better demand and supply 
coordination) 
 
9. Providing an explicit policy on labour migration  
 
An explicit labour migration policy must be established to ensure that Filipinos leaving to 
work abroad get quality jobs and that they are amply protected in the host countries.  This 
should be complementary to the labour migration management programmes of government 
through the POEA and OWWA. 
 
10. Implementation of a comprehensive social protection that covers both the formal and 
informal sector especially the poorest of the poor or the chronic poor. 
 
- Formal Sector: unemployment insurance, Philhealth policy on unemployment 
- Informal sector (entrepreneurial poor): micro finance and microinsurance (MBAs) 
- Poorest of the Poor: Conditional Cash transfers; 100 day guaranteed employment 
- Continued implementation of National targeting system towards a comprehensive 
database on poor households which is regularly updated. 
- Rationalization of remaining social protection programmes to avoid duplication and 
wastage. 
 
The successful implementation of a comprehensive social protection programme and the 
impetus towards higher growth and economic activity are important components of 
rebalancing in the country where the reliance on exports and outward flows can be decreased.  
Again, an efficient social safety net which was earlier proposed by Lamberte (2001) in the 
aftermath of the East Asian Crisis should also be incorporated in this system 
 
11. Putting in place a permanent and multi-stakeholder coordinative mechanism to address 
crisis and emergency situations because of any origin whether economic, political, conflicts 
or natural disasters.  This mechanism must also integrate a monitoring system that will 
immediately inform policy makers of increasing vulnerabilities of the economy.  This has 
already been proposed by Lamberte (2001) after the East Asian Crisis. Lessons from the 
current response to the crisis and the past two typhoons should be taken into account for this 
                                                 
27
 This includes  Deped’s ongoing BESRA  
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proposal. A mechanism must also be put in place to get immediate feedback and 
recommendations from households themselves; this can be incorporated in the National 
Household Targeting System currently being implemented by the DSWD.  
 
12.  Strong international reserves position of Asian countries had been crucial in shielding 
them from an Asian-crisis type of financial and balance of payment crisis that had hit other 
developing countries.  Thus, at the regional and international levels, the government needs to 
continue participating in the discussions and implementation of mechanisms that will reduce 
the vulnerability of the country to various types of risks e.g. Currency swaps The region may 
need its own “Asian Monetary Fund” that not only saves countries from foreign reserves 
depletion, potential debt default and currency attacks but also one that provides budgetary 
support for fiscal stimulus and for social and safety net spending vitally needed during crises 
and recessions (Lim, 2009) 
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Annex A: Timeline of the Government Response 
 
 
October 8, 2008: The President instructed her economic managers to draw up a contingency plan 
to address the impact of a possible recession of the developed economies on ordinary people in 
the Philippines. 
 
October 14, 2008: A Joint NEDA Cabinet Group and National Anti-Poverty Commission 
Cabinet Group meeting was held in Malacanang.  During the meeting, NEDA and DOLE crafted 
their respective contingency plans for the country.  The plans identified strategies to boost 
growth and to mitigate the possible impact of the crisis on vulnerable sectors. 
 
October 15, 2008. NEDA and DOLE presented before the President and the Cabinet the joint 
contingency Plan for a possible recession in developed economies and how the country could 
respond to the challenges.  It identifies as particularly vulnerable overseas Filipino workers and 
workers in the export sector. 
 
November 11, 2008: During the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) 
meeting, a new set of strategies to improve the economy in the midst of the crisis was formulated 
together with the new DBCC macro-assumptions for 2008 and 2009.  These were presented in 
the Senate DBCC budget hearing on November 12, 2008, stressing the policies that would 
position the country for “the morning after “the global rebound. 
 
December 9, 2008: SSS President and CEO Romulo Neri presented a proposal in response to the 
crisis involving P100 billion worth of infrastructure projects.  This anti-crisis fund was originally 
recommended by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industries (PCCI). 
 
December 16, 2008: NEDA presented before the President and the Cabinet the Economic 
Sustainability Plan which was an update on the crisis response plans.  Added to the contingency 
plan were budget strategy principles, off budget interventions and other measures such as 
intensified monitoring of prices, continuing a low inflation regime and possible reduction of 
import duties for certain industries.  The plan also included a communication program with an 
overarching theme of economic patriotism. 
 
January 6, 2009:  The plan emerged as the Economic Resiliency Plan, stressing the need for the 
government implementing agencies to frontload resources.  Agencies that dealt with 
infrastructure were to pursue full and quick spending of their budgets, shift resources from slow 
to fast moving projects, and implement /scale up quick disbursing high impact projects (i.e. 
labour intensive and with high local value added) 
 
From February 2009, the President required NEDA to provide her and the Cabinet fortnightly 
updates of the global crisis coined as the GRIM report (Global Recession Impact Monitor) which 
later was renamed to GRIN report (Global Recession Impact News) when the economic 
landscape started to improve.  The reporting includes surveillance of global and domestic 
macroeconomic developments related to the Crisis.  The latter includes, summaries of green 
shoots phenomena or improvements occurring in different segments of the global economy as 
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well as opportunities for the Philippine economy in relation to international developments.   
Latest reports on ERP and GRIN can be downloaded from the NEDA website. 
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Annex B: Key Policies and Programmes in the Government Response 
 
 
1.  Monetary Policies 
 
A major objective of the response is to ensure that there is enough liquidity and access to 
credit for firms to be able to survive the Crisis.  This is important especially because the 
exact duration of the Crisis cannot easily be determined.  At the same time, inflation must be 
tempered so as not to add to the burden of vulnerable sectors in coping with the negative 
effects of the crisis.  The key agency responsible for this objective is the BSP, the regulatory 
body overseeing the banking and much of the financial services industries.  However, in this 
crisis, the BSP’s response through monetary policies were coordinated closely with other 
national agencies to mitigate the impact of the Crisis.  The following were the significant 
components of the response28: 
 
a. Liquidity Provision 
 
The BSP reduced its policy rates by a total of 200 basis points from December 200829 
aided by easing inflation which brought the overnight borrowing or reverse repurchase 
rate to 4% and the overnight lending or repurchase rate to 6%. Also, the BSP was ready 
to extend its standing facilities to banks and even introduced a new facility i.e. the US 
dollar repurchase agreement to ensure the normal functioning of credit and financial 
markets and the availability of funds for import requirements. The BSP also reduced the 
regular reserve requirement by two percentage points and increased the rediscounting 
budget from P20 billion to P60 billion and liberalized access to the facility. 
 
b. Strengthening Confidence 
 
Through timely policy issuances and communicating these immediately, the BSP has 
been quick to assure market participants of the adequate supply of liquidity and the 
limited exposure of the banking system to the troubled financial markets of the U.S.. 
Because of these interventions, confidence in the financial markets was maintained. 
 
c. Vigilance Against Inflation 
 
The BSP continued its vigilance over price developments as this is its primary mandate 
and to support economic activity to the extent that the inflation outlook allows. There was 
also a favourable external environment because of the gradual easing of the global prices 
of oil during the crisis. 
 
d. Continued Banking Reforms 
 
                                                 
28
 Based mostly on the written response of Diwa Guinigundo, Deputy Governor, BSP to the author’s questionnaire 
29
 The rates were reduced on the following dates: 18 December 2008; 29 January 2009; 12 February 2009; 5 March 
2009, 16 April 2009, 28 May 2009, 9 July 2009 
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The BSP remained committed to sustain key financial and banking sector reforms that 
will lead to greater efficiency, effective risk management, stronger capital base and 
improved governance standards among banks.  These reforms hopefully would create the 
enabling environment for higher savings to boost financing for investment activities. 
Several policies were implemented to strengthen prudential and regulatory framework for 
banks i.e. amendment of rules on derivatives activities of banks; guidelines on internal 
capital adequacy assessment and supervisory review processes, amendment of financial 
reporting package for trust institutions; simplification of financial reporting package for 
rural and cooperative banks, etc. 
 
e. External Sector Policies 
 
The BSP’s policies continued to be directed towards maintaining a market-determined 
exchange rate with room for intervention to address sharp volatilities, maintaining a 
comfortable level of reserves and ensuring sustainability of the country’s external debt.  
Examples of such policies include the liberalization/streamlining of rules on foreign 
borrowings of private banks for relending purposes and registration of inward foreign 
portfolio investments and streamlining of the documentation requirements on the sale of 
foreign exchange by dealers and money changers. 
 
f. Heightened Regional Cooperation 
 
The BSP has been actively engaging with its regional peers in ASEAN and East Asia to 
share information, discuss emerging developments and pool resources particularly 
foreign exchange reserves. 
 
1. Emergency Employment 
 
a. MOOE budget for hiring displaced workers – Executive Order 782, s 2009 
Allotment of 1.5% of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) of 
agency budget for hiring of displaced workers or their dependents.  
 
b. Frontloading of infrastructure budget – National agencies involved in building 
infrastructure must quickly spend the bulk of their budget, shift resources from slow 
to fast moving projects, and implement /scale up quick disbursing high impact 
projects.  These agencies include the Department of Public Works and Highways, 
Department of Transportation and Communication, Department of Agriculture and 
the Department of Education. These projects, which are labour intensive and have 
high local value added, include accessibility facilities for the disabled; the 
construction, repair, or rehabilitation of irrigation systems; and the construction of 
local roads and asphalt overlay, among others.  National agencies should work with 
LGUs in implementing such projects. 
 
c. Comprehensive Livelihood and Emergency Program (CLEEP)- consists of various 
government sponsored programs which aims to protect the following vulnerable 
sectors: the poor and the hungry, returning OFWs who were laid off from work, 
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workers in the export industry, and out-of school youth from the threats and 
consequences of reduced or lost income as a result of the economic crisis, by 
providing them with emergency employment, cash-for-work and other income-
generating services and funding for livelihood projects.  Programs under CLEEP 
include30: 
 
 Out of School Youth Serving Towards Economic Recovery (OYSTER) for road 
maintenance and flood control 
 One Town One Product (OTOP) 
 Kapit-bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KALAHI) Cash for work to repair health 
facilities 
 Tulong Panghanap buhay sa Ating Disadvantaged Workers (TUPAD) for 
community works 
 Integrated Service for Livelihood Advancement of the Fisherfolk (ISLA) in the 
coastal communities 
 Grassroots Entrepreneurship for Employment in Tourism (GREET) 
 Farm to Market Roads (FMR) 
 Financial Assistance and Micro Financing for Entrepreneurship (FAME) for 
returning OFWs and family dependents 
 Adjustment Measures Program (AMP), Workers Income Augmentation Program 
(WIN AP) and DOLE Integrated Livelihood Programs for displaced and low 
income workers 
 Nurses Assigned in Rural Services (NARS) training cum development project 
mobilizing nurses to poorest communities 
 
2. Social Protection Programs31 
 
a. Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps) 
 
The 4Ps which started in 2008 is a conditional cash transfer programme in which the 
national  government provides cash grant to extremely poor households to allow them to 
meet certain human development goals contingent on compliance with core 
responsibilities. The programme aims to contribute to poverty reduction programme 
through improvement in health, nutrition and education among poor families. The 4Ps is 
aligned with the fulfillment of the country’s commitment in meeting the following 
Millennium Development Goals: a) The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; b) 
The achievement of universal primary education; c) the reduction of child mortality; d) 
the improvement of maternal health, and e) the promotion of gender equality13 
 
b. Katas ng VAT Para Kay Lolo at Lola (Elderly) 
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 Most of these programs were already existing even before the crisis but were given additional budget during the 
crisis 
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 Based on the replies of Undersecretary Alice Bala of DSWD and a paper by Undersecetary Lualhati Pablo of 
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This project is a one time PhP 500.00 cash subsidy to 1,000,000 qualified senior citizens 
funded through a National Government allocation from its oil VAT collection.  This was 
implemented nationwide in coordination with Local Government Units (LGUs) and the 
Office of the Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA). 
 
c. SEA-K 
 
The Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran (SEA-K) Program is a capability-building 
program in coordination with the LGUs, designed to enhance the socio-economic skills 
of poor families in establishing and managing a sustainable community-based microcredit 
organization for entrepreneurial development. Its components include social preparation, 
the formation of groups and associations, capital assistance, savings mobilization, and 
access to other social services. 
 
d. Food for School Program 
 
This is part of the Accelerated Hunger-Mitigation Program (AHMP) of the Philippine 
Government. This aims to address hunger among families through a food subsidy of a 
daily ration of one (1) kilo of iron-fortified rice per family. It is a food subsidy per 
child/student providing daily ration of one (1) kilo of iron-fortified rice per child from 
first to sixth grade in actual attendance at Department of Education- supervised day care 
centers and elementary schools. Its target areas are the “hot-spots in National Capital 
Region. 
 
e. Tindahan Natin and Family Access Cards 
 
Tindahan Natin Project is a national government initiative for job generation, livelihood, 
and food security. The project provides low-priced quality rice and noodles to low 
income families through a store jointly identified and endorsed by the DSWD and the 
local government units (LGUs). 
 
The Family Access Cards is the Government Rice Assistance Program that allows poor 
families in Metro Manila to purchase National Food Authority rice at very low prices. 
Both are pro-poor poverty alleviation projects implemented in Metro Manila and 49 
provinces with high incidences of poverty and hunger. 
 
f. National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) 
 
The NHTS-PR aims to establish a socio-economic database of poor households who will 
be beneficiaries of social protection programmes.  This system hopes to facilitate high 
quality information with public and private social protection stakeholders to prevent 
inclusion of non-poor and undercoverage or exclusion of the poor in social protection 
programmes. 
 
3. Training for Work Scholarship Programs 
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Spearheaded by TESDA, these scholarship programs targeted displaced workers within the 
country and OFWs and their dependents. A prime example is the Pangulong Gloria 
Scholarship, formerly known as the PGMA Training for Work Scholarship Program (PGMA-
TWSP) which was originally launched in May 2006. It was expanded under the ERP to cater 
to poor but deserving Filipinos.  Trainings are related to the following sectors - business 
process outsourcing, call centers, medical and legal transcription, animation, software 
development, health care, etc.. 
 
4. Assistance to Displaced Overseas Filipino Workers 
 
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), has striven to guarantee safety nets for 
workers affected by the global crisis including displaced overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 
This program includes: a) counseling and advisory programs to guide laid-off workers on 
their re-entry to productive employment; b) employment services to reconnect them with 
productive employment; and c) training, negotiation, and legal services that ensure workers 
recover unpaid salaries, benefits, and other monetary claims. POEA gave legal assistance and 
employment facilitation services. OWWA was responsible for repatriation services and 
TESDA for training and scholarships.  DOLE also actively participated in international 
dialogues to promote the welfare of overseas and migrant workers. 
 
5. Social Insurance through PhilHealth 
 
The Philippine Health Insurance (PhilHealth) is the largest social protection institution in the 
Philippines. Around 66 % of the population is covered with the formal sector being covered 
almost 100%  and the informal sector, 50% (Weber and Piechulek, 2009). The Philippine 
Health Insurance Corporation or PhilHealth, a government agency, implements the National 
Health Insurance Act of 1995 (Republic Act 7875) through the National Health Insurance 
Program (NHIP). NHIP replaced and improved the old Medicare Program introduced 23 
years earlier. Its mandate is to provide all citizens with the mechanism to gain financial 
access to health services, in combination with other government health programs. For the 
Crisis response, PhilHealth was mandated to increase its coverage and to improve its benefits 
to its members. 
 
Benefits include: 
 
- Inpatient coverage. PhilHealth provides subsidy for room and board, drugs and 
medicines, laboratories, operating room and professional fees for confinements of not 
less than 24 hours.  
- Outpatient coverage. Day surgeries, dialysis and cancer treatment procedures such as 
chemotheraphy and radiotheraphy in accredited hospitals and free-standing clinics. 
- Special benefit packages. Coverage for up to the fourth normal delivery, Newborn Care, 
Package, TB treatment through DOTS, etc. 
 
6. Housing Programmes 
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The government through the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council 
(HUDCC) targeted to disburse PhP 85 billion loans to both institutional (developers and 
LGUs) and individual users.  As housing has a large multiplier effect throughout the 
economy, an expansion of housing activities will help mitigate the impact of the Crisis. 
 
7. Multi-stakeholder Conferences and Consultations32 
 
The Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE) also spearheaded national and 
international consultations among tripartite and other social partners which led to the 
commitment of key stakeholders in saving and preserving jobs and in supporting business 
growth and workers safety nets: 
 
- Multi-sectoral Conference on the Global Financial Crisis: responding to the Employment 
Challenge, January 30, 2009, OSHC, Diliman, Quezon City 
- Multi-sectoral Summit on Business Growth and Employment, Safety Nets Group Pre-
Conference, February 5, 2009, Bayview Park Hotel, Manila 
- Multi-sectoral Job Summit: Joining Hands Against the Global Crisis, February 9, 2009, 
Malacanang Palace, Manila 
- Multi-sectroal Conference for GFC Affected Workers in Selected Agri-based Industries, 
February 13-14, Apo View Hotel, Davao City 
- Overseas Employment Jobs Forum, March 02, 2009, Malacanag, Manila 
- Employment and Business Opportunities: The Middle east Forum, April 12-13, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates 
 
The DOLE also sponsored various job fairs for displaced and unemployed workers. One of 
these was held during Labour Day,  May 1, 2009. 
 
8. Export Support Fund 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has already received a fifth of the Export 
Support Fund (ESF) of P1 billion. 70 % of the ESF will be allocated to export development 
and promotion projects of small and medium enterprises, while the remaining 30 % will be 
distributed among large-scale exporters, such as those from the business process out-
sourcing, information technology, and semiconductors and electronics manufacturing 
industries.  The Export Development Council is currently reviewing the viability of the 
submitted proposals availing of this fund.  The government has approved 19 proposals 
totaling P288.4 million for financing under the Export Support Fund (ESF) only in 
November 2009. 17 of these projects were marketing and promotions initiatives of industry 
groups, such as the Buy Pinoy Movement Foundation, Chamber of Furniture Industries in 
the Philippines (CFIP), Confederation of Philippine Jewelers Inc. (CPJI), Home Accents 
Group of the Philippines Inc. (HAPI), PHILEXPORT-Davao, Philippine Chamber of 
Handicrafts Industries (PCHI), Philippine Food Processors and Exporters Organization Inc. 
(Philfodex), and the association of natural and organic product manufacturers. The Center 
for International Trade Expositions and Missions (CITEM), Cebu Fashion Accessories 
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Manufacturers and Exporters Foundation (Cebu FAME), and Philippine Coconut Authority 
(PCA) were also granted funding for their marketing and promotions projects. A program to 
train designers, and the establishment of a common service facility, were also approved for 
funding. 
 
9. Local Government Assistance 
 
Most of the programmes discussed above were usually implemented in coordination with the 
local governments of affected areas as the latter are usually in the forefront of basic services 
delivered to their constituents.  Most of the LGUs also put up their own counterpart funds for 
the various programmes, e.g. CLEEP.  Some programmes and projects implemented by 
LGUs include the following: 
 
- Job Fairs, Counselling and Placements - usually these are referral systems implemented 
by local Public Employment Service Offices (PESO) e.g. Laguna 
- Livelihood and Trainings – usually implemented in coordination with TESDA and other 
concerned national agencies.  An example was a Trapaulin-making project uder the Rizal 
Province led by Governor Ynares. 
- Trade Fairs – The provincial government of Cebu assisted exporters to exhibit their 
products and wares by sponsoring such fairs in their edifices 
- Assistance to Vulnerable Sectors – provincial and city governments usually have funds 
for cash assistance to very poor households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
